Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law
Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship
2020

Litigating Citizenship
Cassandra Burke Robertson
Irina D. Manta
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cassandra Burke Robertson and Irina D. Manta, Litigating Citizenship, 73 Vand. L. Rev. 757 (2020)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship/1304

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra
Law. For more information, please contact lawlas@hofstra.edu.

Litigating Citizenship
Cassandra Burke Robertson*
Irina D. Manta**
By what standard of proof—and by what procedures—can the
U.S. government challenge citizenship status? That question has taken
on greater urgency in recent years. News reports discuss cases of
individuals whose passports were suddenly denied, even after the
government had previously recognized their citizenship for years or even
decades. The government has also stepped up efforts to reevaluate the
naturalization files of other citizens and has asked for funding to litigate
more than a thousand denaturalization cases. Likewise, citizens have
gotten swept up in immigration enforcement actions, and thousands of
citizens have been erroneously detained or removed from the United
States. Most scholarly treatment of citizenship rights has focused on the
substantive protection of those rights. But the procedures by which
citizenship cases are litigated are just as important—and sometimes
more important—to ensure that citizenship rights are safe.
This Article analyzes the due process implications of citizenship
litigation in the United States. It examines different stages at which the
citizenship question is judicially resolved, including denaturalization,
removal and exclusion, and restrictions on the exercise of citizenship
rights such as voting, working, and traveling. The Article concludes that
the structure of U.S. democracy relies on the stability of citizenship and
requires heightened procedural protections when the government
challenges an individual’s citizenship. In the words of Justice
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Frankfurter, “The history of liberty has largely been the history of
observance of procedural safeguards.”1 Those procedural safeguards are
needed to ensure that the judicial branch can remain the stalwart
protector of a key pillar of our constitutional democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
Citizenship has played a central role in the American
imagination from the time of the founding to the current era. To the
Founders, citizenship was closely linked to notions of consent and
political legitimacy. The Declaration of Independence proclaimed that
governments “deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the
governed.”2
1.
2.

McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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This civic notion became enshrined in the law of the new nation:
citizens themselves would hold sovereignty, and citizenship would give
individuals the right and the responsibility to participate in electing
government representatives, as well as the ability to run for and to hold
such offices themselves. Under the Founders’ view, radical for its time,
power would flow from the citizens to the state—the opposite of the
English monarchy of the day, where power was lodged firmly in the
sovereign and shared with the people only by the grace of that
sovereign.3 In the American experiment, the state could legitimately
exercise only the power given to it by the citizens, and it had no other
source or authority over its citizens beyond what those citizens had
voluntarily consented to give it.4
Citizenship is so closely linked to democracy that the Supreme
Court once stated that it was preferable to have many immigrants
“improperly admitted” to the country than to have even one citizen
“permanently excluded from his country.”5 And the Court recognized
that citizenship and political power could be tightly entwined, warning
that the Constitution must protect citizenship status because “[t]he
very nature of our free government makes it completely incongruous to
have a rule of law under which a group of citizens temporarily in office
can deprive another group of citizens of their citizenship.”6
These statements have turned out to be more aspirational than
descriptive. Recent news reports discuss cases of individuals whose
passports were suddenly denied, even after the government had
previously recognized their citizenship for years or even decades.7
Likewise, citizens have gotten swept up in immigration enforcement
actions, and thousands of citizens have been erroneously detained or
removed from the United States.8 The government has also stepped up
efforts to reevaluate the naturalization files of other citizens and has
asked for funding to litigate more than a thousand denaturalization
cases.9

3.
Liav Orgad, Creating New Americans: The Essence of Americanism Under the Citizenship
Test, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1227, 1295 (2011) (“Unlike Europe’s ethnic and cultural nationalism,
American nationalism is basically civic; the United States is an idea-based nation.”).
4.
Kurt T. Lash, The Sum of All Delegated Power: A Response to Richard Primus, The Limits
of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 180, 201 (2014) (“Post-revolutionary America embraced the
ideal of democratic government in which the only legitimate powers of government were those
delegated by the consent of the governed, but gave this idea a distinctly American spin.” (citation
omitted)).
5.
Kwok Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 464 (1920).
6.
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
7.
See infra Section II.A.
8.
See infra Section II.B.
9.
See infra Section II.C.
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Citizenship determination is not a new problem in American
Nor is it a problem of legal definition. The Constitution, through
the Citizenship Clause and Naturalization Clause, offers a legal
framework for defining the legal qualifications for citizenship, and
federal statutes fill in the gaps. Individuals born in the United States,
individuals naturalized pursuant to U.S. law, and children born of U.S.
citizens all have a legal right to citizenship.11 The problem is a factual
one: How do we determine when a particular individual meets—or fails
to meet—the legal requirements that determine citizenship under our
laws?
This is an area where the rights of citizens and the rights of
noncitizen immigrants are closely linked. In spite of political rhetoric
that attempts to drive a wedge between citizen and immigrant,
vindictive immigration crackdowns inherently sweep up citizens in
their midst.12 As Professor Rachel Rosenbloom has argued, “procedural
safeguards within an adjudicatory system cannot be premised on a line
that the system is itself engaged in drawing.”13 That is, procedural
safeguards cannot be offered only to citizens because those safeguards
are needed to protect the citizenship determination itself. Procedural
safeguards must apply at an earlier stage, ensuring that individuals
engaged in the legal system—whether they are known to be citizens or
not—have a full and fair opportunity to have their claims heard.
This Article analyzes the procedural aspects of citizenship
determination. It asserts that these procedures are often as politically
significant as the substantive law underlying citizenship rights and
that heightened levels of due process are constitutionally required in
cases where citizenship is at issue. Part I illustrates the substantive
and procedural issues historically at play in citizenship litigation.
Part II analyzes three contexts where disputes often arise in the
contemporary era: in failure to recognize potentially valid claims of
citizenship, in removal and exclusion proceedings, and in
denaturalization cases. Part III analyzes the due process implications
of these proceedings, considering the constitutional underpinnings of
the citizenship decision. Finally, Part IV argues that the United States’
law.10

10. See infra Part I.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1431, 1433 (2012).
12. Cassandra Burke Robertson & Irina D. Manta, A Long-Running Immigration Problem:
The Government Sometimes Detains and Deports US Citizens, CONVERSATION (July 8, 2019, 7:09
AM),
https://theconversation.com/a-long-running-immigration-problem-the-governmentsometimes-detains-and-deports-us-citizens-119702 [https://perma.cc/W23V-MP2W].
13. Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54
B.C. L. REV. 1965, 2021–22 (2013).
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system of constitutional democracy requires the courts to take special
care when addressing citizenship claims.
I. SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE IN CITIZENSHIP DISPUTES
U.S. citizenship carries significant rights and privileges.
Perhaps most importantly, it confers membership in a political polity in
which the citizens themselves hold sovereignty and determine the scope
of governmental legitimacy.14 On a practical level, citizenship confers
the right to enter and remain in the United States, the right to hold
employment in the country, and the right to obtain a passport for
international travel. These philosophical and practical benefits combine
to create both a strong sense of identity and a difficult legal terrain. On
one side, citizenship gives rise to an American identity,15 a sense of
belonging to a nation, and, in the words of activist Emma Goldman, “the
possession of a certain guarantee of security, the assurance of having
some spot you can call your own and that no one can alienate from
you.”16
On the legal side, however, Emma Goldman’s own case shows
both the complexity of protecting citizenship and the political
vulnerability of citizenship status. Goldman’s characterization of the
citizenship identity reflected her ideal, but not her reality: the U.S.
government stripped her of citizenship in 1909 and deported her ten
years later.17 Goldman was targeted for her anarchist political views,
which were radical for their time and perceived as dangerous to the
United States. When the U.S. government could not identify a legal
ground on which to deport her (she had immigrated legally and gained
14. See Abner S. Greene, What Is Constitutional Obligation?, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1239, 1249–50
(2013):
That we usually do not trust any branch of government, level of government, or official,
to have unchecked power properly reflects the core notion of citizen sovereignty. We
delegate our sovereignty but it must be retained; seeing power as located outside
ourselves is a danger; keeping such repositories of power fractured, unsettled in this
way, helps advance citizen sovereignty;
see also Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 62−63 (1958) (Warren, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Congress does not have the power to strip citizenship because its power derives from the consent
of citizens).
15. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 202 (1996)
(“[N]ational identities are not givens, but rather, socially constructed products of learning,
knowledge, cultural practices, and ideology.”); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Due Process in the
American Identity, 64 ALA. L. REV. 255, 285 (2012) (noting that political legitimacy is maximized
when legal procedures comport with national identity).
16. Emma Goldman, A Woman Without a Country, in FREE VISTAS (Joseph Ishill ed., 1933),
reprinted in PATRICK WEIL, THE SOVEREIGN CITIZEN: DENATURALIZATION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC app. 1 at 188, 188 (2013).
17. WEIL, supra note 16, at 60.
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citizenship through marriage), it found a roundabout way to do so.
Scouring her estranged husband’s immigration file revealed that he had
improperly obtained naturalization at age sixteen, before he reached
the age of legal majority. He could therefore be denaturalized, and,
under the law of the time, Goldman would be deemed to have lost her
citizenship automatically.18 The Department of Justice did not inform
Goldman that she had lost citizenship when the government
denaturalized her husband—instead, officials “hoped she would leave
the country unaware, that, in [the Department’s] view, she [had] lost
her citizenship,” thus making it easier for the government simply to bar
her return.19 This plan did not work, and Goldman published a version
of her famous statement, “A Woman Without a Country,” in response to
her loss of citizenship in 1909.20
It took an act of Congress—specifically, the 1918 Anarchist
Exclusion Act—to create a legal basis for her expulsion from the
country.21 The Act increased sanctions, extending the time period
during which an individual would be subject to deportation, and “for the
first time appropriated funds for the enforcement.”22 In addition to
targeting Goldman, the enforcement effort focused on “immigrant
anarchists and communists in a sweep of postwar vengeance against
radicalism and labor militancy,” arresting “10,000 alleged anarchists”
and deporting 500 of them.23
Under the substantive law in effect in 1919, there was no clear
error in Goldman’s case. Even at the time, however, there were those
who questioned whether such a result comported with U.S.
constitutional protections for speech, for political expression, and for
gender equity. Louis F. Post, the Assistant Secretary of Labor who had
revoked her citizenship, acknowledged doubt as to the underlying
legality of that decision.24 Post had acceded to responsibility within the
Department of Labor after Secretary William Wilson had to step aside
for illness.25 He was known as someone who “invariably took the side of
the poor and downtrodden,” and he “ordered the release of aliens held
18. Id.
19. Id. at 61.
20. Id. at 187.
21. Id. at 62.
22. Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and
Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921-1965, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 69, 74 (2003).
23. Id.
24. See LOUIS F. POST, THE DEPORTATIONS DELIRIUM OF NINETEEN-TWENTY 16 (1923)
(“Whether or not I liked the law did not enter in[to] [the decision]. I was not a maker of laws but
an administrator of a law already constitutionally made. . . . And this law was mandatory.”).
25. Paul D. Carrington, Fearing Fear Itself: The Encounter of A. Mitchell Palmer with Louis
F. Post, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 375, 383 (2002).
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on illegally obtained evidence, or against whom the only evidence was
their membership in an organization that had been folded into the
Communist Party without their consent.”26
Even if Post doubted the legality of the Goldman deportation
decision, however, he ultimately expressed faith in the procedure
leading to the decision and laid blame on her failure to legally challenge
the ruling, asserting in his memoirs that “[i]f I erred, my decision was
jurisdictional and would have been reviewed by the courts in habeas
corpus proceedings. But Miss Goldman did not take her case to the
courts.”27
It was not true, however, that Goldman failed to take her case
to the courts. She appeared in front of Judge Julius M. Mayer in 1919
to contest her deportation, seeking that very writ of habeas corpus.28
The judge ruled that as an alien, she had no constitutional claim to
avoid deportation. Although her attorney asked for a two-week stay to
appeal the ruling, she was given only three days.29 Her stay application
in the Supreme Court was denied by Justice Brandeis in December
1919, only eleven days before the ship deporting Goldman and 248
others would set sail for Russia.30
It does not appear that there is much that Goldman or her
attorney could have done to challenge the ruling. Intervention in her
husband’s case would likely have been denied; in the years following,
other courts would hold that “the validity of derivative rights of a wife
or minor child” were not subject to independent protection in cases of
alleged nationalization fraud and would not create standing.31
In the century since Goldman’s denationalization and
deportation, the substantive law has changed significantly. The
26. Id. at 383–84.
27. POST, supra note 24, at 12–18.
28. Emma Goldman and Berkman are Ordered Banished, EVENING WORLD (Dec. 8, 1919),
https://thegrandarchive.wordpress.com/emma-goldman-and-berkman-are-ordere-banished/
[https://perma.cc/DU7Q-VDV4].
29. Id.
30. WEIL, supra note 16, at 63. It is telling that Justice Brandeis was the one to deny her
motion. Justice Brandeis was the member of the Court most likely to rule in Goldman’s favor. He
had earlier been one of two Justices to dissent to a decision denying the return of bail money posted
by Goldman, Berkman v. United States, 250 U.S. 114, 118 (1919), and he would later champion
free-speech positions similar to those that Goldman had advocated. DANIEL KANSTROOM,
DEPORTATION NATION 151 (2010).
31. United States ex rel. Harrington v. Schlotfeldt, 136 F.2d 935, 939–40 (7th Cir. 1943)
(refusing to appoint a guardian ad litem for a child in the father’s denaturalization case, as the
child’s citizenship rights “must rise or fall solely on the basis of the rights of the . . . parent from
whom they stem, and there are no rights to be protected independently by guardian ad litem”);
United States v. Milana, 148 F. Supp. 152, 153 (E.D. Mich. 1957) (stating that a child’s “derivative
citizenship would not have given him standing to be heard in a proceeding to revoke his father’s
citizenship”).
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grounds on which citizenship can be lost have greatly narrowed.32 And
women are no longer deemed to derive citizenship from their husbands,
so a man’s loss of citizenship is no longer imputed to his wife.33 Once
these substantive protections were enacted, they greatly reduced
litigation over citizenship. As a result, citizenship rights have been
largely taken for granted over the last few decades, and citizenship
became “an area of U.S. constitutional law that has historically been of
utmost importance but has largely faded from the collective
consciousness.”34
But citizenship litigation is making a comeback.35 And even if
the substantive basis of the Goldman case has eroded with time, the
procedural due process issues remain timeless. Goldman claimed that
she lacked the opportunity to defend her citizenship. She asserted that
the action against her husband left her no “opportunity to defend or
show the falsity of the government’s position” and that the government
had targeted her for her unpopular opinions.36
The procedural tension of Goldman’s case applies with equal
force today. Citizenship questions still arise when individuals are
perceived to be disloyal to the United States or when individuals are
believed to be fraudulently attempting to obtain the benefits of a
citizenship they do not deserve and to which they are not legally
entitled.37 Some scholars, in fact, have posited that it is the very
strength of the citizenship identity and citizenship ideal that make it
legally vulnerable.38 Professor D. Carolina Núñez reviewed some of the
most recent citizenship literature, concluding that “perhaps the most
dangerous potential result of the gap between a lofty imagined
citizenship and the legal structures of citizenship”39 is a tendency to put
citizenship on so high a pedestal that we “risk . . . us[ing] the almost
other-worldly vision of citizenship to exclude people from citizenship
32. See Cassandra Burke Robertson & Irina D. Manta, (Un)Civil Denaturalization, 94 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 402, 407 (2019) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 1967 limitation of grounds for
denaturalization to fraud and illegal procurement).
33. The spousal application was partially repealed by Congress in 1922 with the passage of
the Cable Act and was fully repealed in 1931. Jennifer M. Chacón, Loving Across Borders:
Immigration Law and the Limits of Loving, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 345, 356–57.
34. Jonathan Shaub, Hoda Muthana and Shamima Begum: Citizenship and Expatriation in
the U.S. and U.K., LAWFARE (Feb. 25, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/hodamuthana-and-shamima-begum-citizenship-and-expatriation-us-and-uk [https://perma.cc/9PNSDV65].
35. Id.; see also Robertson & Manta, supra note 32, at 471 (discussing the resurgence of civil
denaturalization after a fifty-year dormancy).
36. WEIL, supra note 16, at 62–63.
37. See infra Part II.
38. D. Carolina Núñez, Citizenship Gaps, 54 TULSA L. REV. 301, 313 (2019).
39. Id.
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based on biases.”40 This “citizenship gap” leaves room to question
citizenship based on suspicions of disloyalty or on racial or ethnic bias.41
If it is true that this tension is inherent in the American ideal of
citizenship, then the procedural due process protections of our justice
system become even more critical to avoid wielding citizenship as a “tool
of exclusion” to keep out those deemed politically undesirable.42 This is
especially true when the politicized nature of the citizenship
determination makes it less likely that the political branches will be
able to provide such protections. After all, citizenship is so closely tied
to voting rights that naturalization policies have been politically
charged since the early days of the country. When that political tension
is combined with the gap between imagined citizenship and the legal
structures, the political divide grows even larger.43 And finally, common
cognitive biases can dampen the public’s sense of injustice in the face of
politically targeted citizenship policies. When a decision is made to
exclude an individual from the polity, onlookers may succumb to
hindsight bias. They may be more likely to conclude that the result
must have been warranted—that the procedures governing the
litigation process would surely have protected against an unjust
result.44 This hindsight bias can combine with what is known as
“fundamental attribution error”—that is, a tendency to assign greater
weight to individual merit, undervaluing context and circumstance.45
The substantive importance of citizenship in American life
therefore leads to the counterintuitive result that citizenship is also
legally and politically vulnerable. This tension certainly existed in
Emma Goldman’s case, and the changes to substantive law in the
ensuing century have not eliminated that tension. Even today,
politicians propose legal changes based on citizenship as a tool of
exclusion—for example, suggesting that some individuals are citizens

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 313–14.
43. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judicial Impartiality in a Partisan Era, 70 FLA. L. REV. 739,
746 (2018) (explaining that the country’s “growing polarization means that there is less and less
common ground on issues of public concern”).
44. See Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in
Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 99 (1995) (finding that, under controlled conditions, jurors
in hindsight may harshly judge a good-faith effort to determine reasonable precautions in
foresight).
45. Victor D. Quintanilla, (Mis)judging Intent: The Fundamental Attribution Error in Federal
Securities Law, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 195, 200 (2010) (“Social-psychological research, moreover, has
shown that decision-makers systematically misattribute blame and intent: overestimating the role
of dispositions (i.e., personality, traits, attitudes, character) and underestimating the role of social
influences.”).

766

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:3:757

in name only, questioning the merit of naturalization decisions,46 and
proposing new bases for citizenship loss.47 The government’s decision to
legally challenge an individual’s citizenship carries both legal and
normative weight. Such an action may raise questions about an
individual’s loyalty to the country as well as his or her depth of social
connection to a particular view of American culture—questions often
expressed using language with racial or ethnic overtones.48 When such
challenges arise, the due process protections offered by the judicial
branch are key to ensuring that individuals’ rights are not infringed.
The procedures by which these disputes are resolved can matter as
much as—and sometimes even more than—the substantive law
governing the claim.49
II. CONTEMPORARY CITIZENSHIP DISPUTES
Although the law has changed significantly since Emma
Goldman’s day, citizenship challenges in the United States have never
gone away. Legal challenges tend to arise in three different arenas.
First, the government may simply not recognize an individual’s claim
of citizenship and thus may refuse to issue her a passport, allow her to
vote, or permit her to return to the country. In this case, the individual
may raise the issue of citizenship offensively, seeking a declaratory
judgment of citizenship and a recognition of associated rights. Second,
the government may attempt to remove or exclude an individual from

46. Robertson & Manta, supra note 32, at 469–70 (quoting Russian President Putin’s
characterization that some individuals “[m]aybe . . . are not even Russians . . . but Ukrainians,
Tatars or Jews, but with Russian citizenship, which should also be checked,” as well as President
Trump’s tweet falsely claiming that President Obama had “granted citizenship, during the terrible
Iran Deal negotiation, to 2500 Iranians – including to government officials”).
47. For example, President Trump suggested that flag burning should result in the loss of
citizenship. Charlie Savage, Trump Calls for Revoking Flag Burners’ Citizenship. Court Rulings
Forbid It., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/us/politics/trump-flagburners-citizenship-first-amendment.html [https://perma.cc/9TUT-J9JS]. The Administration has
also proposed citizenship loss as a sanction for providing terrorist support. Josh Gerstein, Trump
Officials Pushing to Strip Convicted Terrorists of Citizenship, POLITICO (June 8, 2019, 6:17 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/08/trump-convicted-terrorists-citizenship-1357278
[https://perma.cc/5ZXR-M5UC]. Both actions, however, would conflict with the Supreme Court’s
constitutional rulings protecting against the involuntary removal of citizenship status.
48. See infra Section II.A.1 (discussing the cases of Hoda Muthana and Mark Esqueda).
49. The importance of procedure, of course, has long been recognized. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that “procedural rules may often be more important than the
substance” of legal rules, pointing to the “immortal words” of former U.S. Representative John
Dingell, who famously claimed, “I’ll let you write the substance . . . and you let me write the
procedure. I’ll screw you every time.” Clemons v. Norton Healthcare Inc. Ret. Plan, 890 F.3d 254,
269 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Regulatory Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm.
on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312
(1983) (statement of Rep. John Dingell)).
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the United States under the belief that he or she lacks citizenship. Most
often, such action occurs subsequent to a criminal arrest or a period of
detention. In such cases, the individual may attempt to raise the issue
of citizenship defensively, as a means of avoiding deportation. Finally,
the government may seek denaturalization, attempting to revoke
citizenship either because the government mistakenly granted it to a
person who failed to meet the statutory requirements or because the
individual committed fraud in the naturalization process. This Part
analyzes the contemporary disputes that arise under each of these
categories and examines the procedures by which such disputes can be
litigated.
A. Failure to Recognize Citizenship Claims
Most people born in the United States are able to take their
citizenship for granted. When they apply for a passport or register to
vote, their birth certificates are accepted as proof of citizenship.50 When
problems arise, however,51 or when a birth certificate is not accepted as
sufficiently credible proof, it can be difficult for an individual to prove
citizenship.
1. Questioning Citizenship
It was a passport application that first raised questions in the
case of Mark Esqueda.52 He did not expect to have trouble obtaining a
passport; he was born in Texas, was raised in Minnesota, and served in
the U.S. military. His service included fighting in combat zones, earning
an honorable discharge, and even obtaining a high-level security
clearance only available to U.S. citizens, for which he had to pass a

50. Proof of U.S. Citizenship and Identification When Applying for a Job, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/us-citizenship/proof-us-citizenship-and-identificationwhen-applying-a-job (last updated July 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/YQ9F-UTZW].
51. Particular problems involving citizenship can be unusual and hard to predict. Thus, for
example, even a Customs and Border Protection officer became embroiled in a citizenship problem
when his employer uncovered a Mexican birth certificate with his name on it. Not only did the
officer not have any idea that he might have been born in Mexico, but it also caused citizenship
problems for his oldest child, who was born outside the United States. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, U.S.
Customs Officer Loses Job and Citizenship Case over His Mexican Birth Certificate, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 26, 2019, 5:31 PM), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-11-26/u-s-customsofficer-loses-job-citizenship-due-to-birth-certificate-challenge [https://perma.cc/QXH4-ZUGQ].
52. Brandon Stahl, Minnesota Man and Marine Vet Born in U.S. Files Legal Challenge to
Passport Denial, STARTRIBUNE (May 9, 2019, 10:42 PM), http://www.startribune.com/minnesotaman-born-in-u-s-files-legal-challenge-to-passport-denial/509719882/
[https://perma.cc/L5GQUZ9R].
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background check.53 Nevertheless, his application for a U.S. passport
was rejected—twice.54 Although Esqueda possessed an authentic
Texas-issued birth certificate, the U.S. government denied its
accuracy.55 Esqueda’s birth in the border region of Texas was assisted
by a midwife that the government had deemed “not reliable.”56
Some midwives in the border region had been prosecuted for
accepting bribes to record the United States as the place of birth for
babies born on the Mexican side of the border.57 That history made the
birth certificates of all births witnessed by border-region midwives
suspect, even if the vast majority of records were correct. Nonetheless,
families in the border region are familiar with the need to prove
citizenship, and some had the foresight to obtain additional
documents.58 In Esqueda’s case, this included a law-enforcement
witness to his birth.59 After his first passport application was denied
based on questions about his birth certificate, Esqueda supplied more
evidence: a signed document from the police officer who witnessed his
birth, his military records, and sworn affidavits from family and friends
acquainted with his mother in Texas during the time she was pregnant
with him.60 When none of that was deemed sufficient to prove his
citizenship, Esqueda brought suit in federal court with the assistance
of the ACLU, seeking to compel the government to recognize his
citizenship and issue him a passport.61
Although questions about the validity of birth records most
commonly affect those born near the Texas-Mexico border (and

53. Id.; Esqueda v. Pompeo, ACLU MINN., https://www.aclu-mn.org/en/cases/esqueda-vpompeo (last visited Apr. 4, 2019) [https://perma.cc/CT3F-UBSJ] (“The southern Minnesota man
served our country as a U.S. Marine in Iraq and Afghanistan, and again in the Army National
Guard. In the military, he earned the second-highest level of clearance called ‘secret,’ which is only
given to U.S. citizens.”).
54. Stahl, supra note 52 (noting that Esqueda was denied a passport twice and lost an appeal
even after he supplied the government with sworn affidavits from his family and friends attesting
to his citizenship).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see also Kevin Sieff, Harsh Reality: Faulty Midwife Practices Has the Federal
Government Questioning Border Residents’ Citizenships, BROWNSVILLE HERALD (July 20, 2008,
12:00 AM), https://www.brownsvilleherald.com/news/local/harsh-reality-faulty-midwife-practiceshas-the-federal-government-questioning/article_be27396e-39cc-5cc0-9117-be5efade9af9.html
[https://perma.cc/H557-W3LV].
58. See Stahl, supra note 52 (explaining that “police officers often served as witnesses [to
birth] to prevent such citizenship issues from occurring”).
59. Id.
60. Esqueda v. Pompeo, supra note 53.
61. Id.
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especially those of Latino heritage),62 others have had difficulty
establishing proof of citizenship as well. Gwyneth Barbara, a white
woman born in Kansas, was similarly denied a passport.63 She was born
in a Kansas farmhouse in the 1970s, and her father registered her birth
at the local courthouse within days.64 Nonetheless, “because her birth
certificate was not issued at [an] institution or hospital, it was not
considered proof enough of her citizenship.”65 She was asked to submit
additional documents verifying her citizenship, but explained that she
was unable to do so: “Border crossing card or green card for your parents
issued prior to your birth? My parents were born in the United
States . . . . Early religious records? We don’t have any. Family Bible?
They won’t accept a birth certificate but they will accept a family
Bible?”66 Unlike Esqueda, however, Barbara was able to resolve the
matter without litigation. She sought help from her U.S. senator, and
after he launched an inquiry Barbara received her passport in the mail
only “[a] few days later,” and “with no explanation.”67
Another recent citizenship case is almost the polar opposite of
Esqueda’s. In Esqueda’s case, the government questioned where he was
born—but never questioned the strength of his loyalty or his service to
this country.68 In the case of Hoda Muthana, however, there was no
question about where she was born—it was undisputed that she was
born in New Jersey—but there was a question about the status of her
parents, which may have come under scrutiny due to her disloyalty to
the United States.69 As a college student in her late teens, Muthana
became infatuated with ISIS.70 She dropped out of college and moved to
62. Stahl, supra note 52 (noting that “the Trump administration is pursuing a crackdown
aimed at Hispanics with fraudulent birth certificates along the border”); see Esqueda v. Pompeo,
supra note 53.
63. Emily Sinovic, Kansas Woman Told Birth Certificate Wasn’t Enough to Prove Citizenship
for Passport, KCTV5 NEWS (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.kctv5.com/news/kansas-woman-toldbirth-certificate-wasn-t-enough-to-prove/article_144c19aa-b50f-11e8-94f5-6b921312a97a.html
[https://perma.cc/J95W-9RAN].
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Stahl, supra note 52.
69. See Steve Vladeck, Unpacking (Some of) the Legal Issues Surrounding Hoda Muthana,
JUST SECURITY (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/62659/unpacking-some-of-issuessurrounding-hoda-muthana/
[https://perma.cc/2YDN-UMJQ];
see
also
Irina
Manta,
Denaturalizing
Natural-Born
Citizens,
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Feb.
26,
2019),
https://reason.com/2019/02/26/denaturalizing-natural-born-citizens/
[https://perma.cc/3U2RQ8RU] (providing further commentary).
70. Rukmini Callimachi & Catherine Porter, 2 American Wives of ISIS Militants Want to
Return Home, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/us/islamic-stateamerican-women.html [https://perma.cc/8M88-9SGL]; Enjoli Francis & James Longman, Former
ISIS Bride Who Left US for Syria Says She “Interpreted Everything Very Wrong,” ABC NEWS (Feb
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Syria to join the group.71 She was married twice to ISIS fighters, both
of whom were later killed, and she gave birth to a son.72 Later, Muthana
decided that she wanted to return to the United States—even if it
meant facing criminal charges for having given aid and comfort to the
country’s enemies.73
While Muthana was out of the country, however, the
government canceled her passport.74 It alleged that she had never
actually been a citizen of the United States, and that the government’s
previous issuance of a passport had been in error.75 Because Muthana
had been born in the United States, her status depended on whether
she had been “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.”76 Her father was a
diplomat, and the children of diplomats do not obtain birthright
citizenship when born in the United States.77 The Constitution’s
Citizenship Clause asserts birthright citizenship only over individuals
“born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof,” and the recognition of diplomatic immunity means that
diplomats’ families are not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United
States.78 The government had previously questioned Muthana’s status
but had granted her a passport after receiving documentation that her
father had left his post prior to her birth.79 Later, however, the
government would change its position, arguing that even though her
father had left his post before her birth, that change in position had not
been reported to the government—and that in the period of time
between leaving his position and communicating that change to the
government, the family would have been entitled to diplomatic
immunity.80
There is no question, of course, that Muthana’s actions
represented the ultimate disloyalty to her claimed country of
citizenship. But it also appears that the government is retaliating
against her for those actions in problematic ways. The Trump
Administration’s unilateral decision to declare her citizenship invalid
19, 2019, 5:48 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/International/isis-bride-left-us-syria-interpretedwrong/story?id=61175508 [https://perma.cc/BRH8-6TTD].
71. Callimachi & Porter, supra note 70.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. Memorandum in Response to the Court’s March 1, 2019 Order at 5, Muthana v. Pompeo,
No. 1:19-cv-00445-RBW, (D.D.C. Mar. 4, 2019).
75. Id. at 1, 5.
76. See id. at 9 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1) (emphasis omitted).
79. See Vladeck, supra note 69.
80. Memorandum in Response to the Court’s March 1, 2019 Order, supra note 74, at 5, 12.
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is neither a lesser sanction nor a viable alternative to criminal
prosecution. Indeed, manipulating the levers of bureaucracy to limit
citizenship rights actually subverts the protections of the criminal
process.81 Criminal proceedings could ultimately result in a high
sanction, but those proceedings would be governed by democratically
enacted laws and would include the right to be judged by a jury
composed of citizens, as well as the right to effective assistance of
counsel.82 The Supreme Court’s decision in Afroyim v. Rusk held that
the government cannot take citizenship away from unwilling
individuals other than in cases of naturalization fraud or illegal
procurement.83 Of course, the government alleged that it was not taking
Muthana’s citizenship away—it was merely reconsidering its opinion
about whether she had ever established citizenship in the first place.84
Ultimately, however, that action had the same effect: Muthana became
unable to exercise previously acknowledged citizenship rights. In late
2019, the federal district court in Muthana’s case made “a surprise
ruling from the bench,” holding that Muthana was not a citizen and
therefore dismissing the claim her father had attempted to bring on her
behalf.85 Muthana was not permitted to return to the United States.86
Her family is appealing this determination at the time of this writing.87
2. Suing for Recognition
When the government fails to recognize a citizenship claim, the
claimant may challenge this determination. The Supreme Court
recognized a right to sue for recognition of citizenship in 1939, in a case
brought by Mary Elizabeth Elg.88 Elg was born in the United States in

81. See Irina D. Manta, The High Cost of Low Sanctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 157, 158 (2014)
(arguing that “low sanctions have a pernicious effect on the democratic process and on legislative
rule making”); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Low Sanctions, High Costs: The Risk to Democratic
Liberty, 66 FLA. L. REV. FORUM 31, 32 (2014) (noting “the risk that a system of informal low
sanctions, brought about through selective non-enforcement, will undermine the will for political
change”).
82. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
83. 387 U.S. 253, 267 (1967). For a more extensive discussion of Afroyim, see infra Section
III.B.
84. Memorandum in Response to the Court’s March 1, 2019 Order, supra note 74, at 1.
85. Charlie Savage, American-Born Woman Who Joined ISIS Is Not a Citizen, Judge Rules,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/14/us/hoda-muthana-isiscitizenship.html [https://perma.cc/QP3R-5N7R]; see Muthana v. Pompeo, No. 19-445 (RBW), 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218098 (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2019).
86. Savage, supra note 85.
87. Muthana, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218098, appeal docketed, No. 19-5362 (D.C. Cir. Dec.
30, 2019).
88. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 349 (1939).
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1907 to Swedish parents.89 Her parents brought her back to Sweden
while she was still a child, but she was determined to return to the
United States when she reached adulthood.90 She obtained a U.S.
passport and was admitted to the United States as a citizen less than a
year after reaching majority.91 Six years after her return to the United
States, however, the U.S. government informed her “that she was an
alien illegally in the United States and [she] was threatened with
deportation.”92 In response, she brought suit in federal court seeking a
declaratory judgment of citizenship and an injunction against
deportation.93 At trial, the government relied on a treaty that the
United States had signed with Sweden recognizing voluntary
relinquishment of citizenship:
Citizens of the United States of America who have resided in Sweden or Norway for a
continuous period of at least five years, and during such residence have become and are
lawfully recognized as citizens of Sweden or Norway, shall be held by the government of
the United States to be Swedish or Norwegian citizens, and shall be treated as such.94

The Supreme Court acknowledged the treaty but pointed out
that it did not specifically address the treatment of minor children.95 As
a result, the Court concluded that Elg had the right to make an election
of citizenship when she reached adulthood and stated that she “has not
lost her citizenship in the United States and is entitled to all the rights
and privileges of that citizenship.”96
The current law allows individuals to challenge citizenship
determinations in much the same way that the Court provided in
Perkins v. Elg. When an individual claiming citizenship is present
within the United States, section 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940
permits the filing of a declaratory judgment action seeking citizenship
recognition.97 The action is ripe when a dispute over citizenship has
arisen—for example, if the individual has not been allowed to obtain a
passport or has not been allowed to vote. The statute provides that “[i]f
any person who is within the United States claims a right or privilege
as a national of the United States and is denied such right or privilege
by any department or independent agency . . . such person may
89. Id. at 327.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 328.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 335 n.12, 336–37 (quoting Convention and Protocol between the United States of
America and Sweden and Norway art. 1, May 26, 1869, 17 Stat. 809).
95. See id. at 337.
96. Id. at 349.
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2012); 8 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 104.12(2)(a) (2019).
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institute an action . . . for a judgment declaring him to be a national of
the United States.”98 The defendant in the declaratory judgment action
is the “head of the department or agency which rejected the citizenship
claim,” often “the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, or the Secretary of State.”99 This section applies only to
declaratory judgment actions, however; it does not apply to removal
cases, which are instead governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252.100 The plaintiff in
the declaratory judgment action bears the burden of proof and must
prove citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence.101
B. Removal and Exclusion
By law, only noncitizens are eligible for removal (deportation)
and exclusion.102 Nonetheless, there have been numerous documented
cases of citizens being deported from the country, often—but not
always—at the end of a criminal proceeding or term of confinement.103
The breadth of administrative discretion over removal actions has
meant that, at times, deportation “may also function as a punishment
for political activity even if the law does not formally categorize it that
way.”104

98. 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a).
99. GORDON ET AL., supra note 97, § 104.12(2)(c).
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012).
101. See Lim v. Mitchell, 431 F.2d 197, 199 (9th Cir. 1970) (“As plaintiff below, Lim had the
burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he is an American citizen.”);
GORDON ET AL., supra note 97, § 104.12(2)(d) (“The plaintiff has the burden of establishing a claim
to U.S. citizenship by a preponderance of evidence. The burden of proof on the plaintiff thus is the
same as it would be in other civil litigation.” (citation omitted)).
102. CHARLES GORDON & ELLEN GITTEL GORDON, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW 2-9
(1982) (“Congress has never barred the entry of United States citizens, and doubtless never will.
Indeed, any legislative attempt to bar the entry of a citizen unquestionably would be an
unconstitutional abridgement of his right of free access to the country of his nationality.”); see
Siegfried Wiessner, Blessed Be the Ties that Bind: The Nexus Between Nationality and Territory,
56 MISS. L.J. 447, 479 (1986):
[A] United States citizen’s right to enter is made dependent, in principle, on the
possession of a valid passport. According to two landmark decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court, the issuance of a passport is protected by the fifth amendment right to travel
and may not even be denied to Communists.
(citation omitted).
103. See, e.g., Lyttle v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1269 (M.D. Ga. 2012) (indicating
that ICE agents initiated removal proceedings against the Plaintiff following a charge for
misdemeanor assault).
104. Michael Kagan, When Immigrants Speak: The Precarious Status of Non-Citizen Speech
Under the First Amendment, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1261 (2016).
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1. Removal of Citizens
In one case, Mark Daniel Lyttle, a U.S. citizen (of Puerto Rican
descent) born in North Carolina was being treated at a psychiatric
facility.105 Two Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents
took him into custody after he was charged with misdemeanor assault
for “inappropriately touching a female orderly.”106 In spite of Lyttle’s
acknowledged cognitive and psychiatric disabilities—and in spite of the
fact that the agents’ own search of U.S. databases “revealed records
showing Lyttle was a U.S. citizen with a valid Social Security
number”—Lyttle was processed for deportation and pressured to sign a
document waiving his right to a removal hearing.107 After he did so, he
was “sent off on foot into Mexico with only three dollars in his pocket.”108
He spoke no Spanish and had no identity documentation or proof of
citizenship.109 He spent 125 days “sleeping in the streets, staying in
shelters, and being imprisoned and abused in Mexico, Honduras, and
Nicaragua” before a U.S. Embassy employee helped him contact his
family and arrange for his return to the United States.110
Occasionally the wrongful deportation of a U.S. citizen may be
aided by the deportee. In one case, a fourteen-year-old runaway, born
in the United States, was arrested for shoplifting at a Houston shopping
mall.111 She lied to law enforcement, her lawyer, and the court about
her name and nationality, and she was subsequently deported to
Colombia, where she remained for seven months.112 According to her
family, she was not fluent in Spanish and had no ties to Colombia.113
Nonetheless, after her deportation she was given “shelter, psychological
assistance and a job at a call center” in that country.114 Her family
discovered where she was after her mother “spent a lot of time on the
Internet trying to track down” her daughter and ultimately located a
Facebook account showing that the girl was in Colombia.115

105. Lyttle, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 1269.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1270.
108. Id. at 1266.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Turner v. United States, No. 4:13-cv-932, 2013 WL 5877358, at *1–2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 31,
2013).
112. Id.
113. Texas Teen Mistakenly Deported Reunites with Mom, CBS NEWS (Jan. 7, 2012, 10:13 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/texas-teen-mistakenly-deported-reunites-with-mom/
[https://perma.cc/CBN9-PXNB].
114. Id.
115. Id.
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These stories might be exceptionally troubling, but the mistaken
detention and deportation of U.S. citizens is not unusual. Government
records show that between 2007 and 2015, over 1,500 U.S. citizens
spent time in immigration detention before their citizenship was
recognized.116 A political scientist who studied the records of U.S.
citizens caught up in immigration detention and deportation
proceedings found that in 2010 alone, “well over 4,000 U.S. citizens
were detained or deported as aliens,” and in the seven years between
2003 and 2010, more than 20,000 were.117 Given the substantive
protection for citizens, each case of citizen removal suggests that there
must have been a procedural weakness or failing. In cases such as that
of the deported teenager, the U.S. citizen may have been complicit in
the proceeding. But even that case is troubling: teenagers, after all, are
not known for their good judgment. In the cases described above, it is
possible that the individuals might have avoided removal if they were
better able (or willing) to advocate for themselves or if counsel had been
appointed to represent them.118 But citizenship rights do not belong just
to those without mental disabilities or just to those with adult
judgment. If citizenship protections are not robust enough to protect
minors and individuals with diminished capacity from wrongful
detention or removal, then these protections cannot support the
equality of citizenship inherent in our constitutional structure.119
2. Recognizing Citizenship in Removal Proceedings
When an individual subject to removal proceedings makes a
claim of citizenship, the government bears the burden of proof to
establish that the individual is a noncitizen.120 A majority of the U.S.
courts of appeals agree that the individual can raise a claim of
citizenship at any time in the proceedings—the claim is not forfeited by

116. Eyder Peralta, You Say You’re an American, but What if You Had to Prove It or Be
Deported?, NPR (Dec. 22, 2016, 12:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/12/22/504031635/you-say-you-re-an-american-but-what-if-you-had-to-prove-it-or-bedeported [https://perma.cc/HH9C-UP9L].
117. Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S. Citizens
as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606, 608 (2011).
118. See infra Section IV.C (discussing the appointment of counsel).
119. Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 232 (1972)
(describing “the premise of equality of citizenship as a constitutive principle in American politics
for its own sake, as a means to no ‘realistic’ end other than a renewed sense of the principled
legitimacy of the whole political enterprise”).
120. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153 (1923) (“It is true that alienage
is a jurisdictional fact; and that an order of deportation must be predicated upon a finding of that
fact. It is true that the burden of proving alienage rests upon the government.” (citation omitted)).
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failure to raise it earlier in the proceedings nor by failure to exhaust
administrative remedies prior to judicial review.121
The government’s burden of persuasion in such proceedings is
heightened: it must establish noncitizenship by “clear, unequivocal, and
convincing evidence.”122 This is unquestionably a higher standard than
an individual seeking a declaratory judgment of citizenship would have
to meet.123 Within that standard, however, courts have applied a
complex burden-shifting scheme. Although the government bears the
initial burden to prove noncitizenship, a mere showing that the
individual was born outside the United States is sufficient to create a
rebuttable presumption of noncitizenship that then shifts the burden to
the person claiming citizenship.124 Once the burden has shifted, the
individual must then either dispute the evidence of birth abroad or
show how citizenship was obtained—perhaps through derivative status
or naturalization.125
Obtaining judicial review typically requires the case to go
through proceedings in several different layers of the judicial
hierarchy.126 Removal cases begin in the administrative system. After
an immigration judge orders removal, the individual may file a petition
for review with the “court of appeals for the judicial circuit in which the
121. See Gonzalez-Alarcon v. Macias, 884 F.3d 1266, 1268 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[A] court must
first consider whether a petitioner is in fact an alien before requiring exhaustion. If a petitioner is
a citizen, the provision does not apply.”); Poole v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 259, 261, 264 (2d Cir. 2008)
(noting that the exhaustion requirement does not apply until a claim of citizenship is resolved);
Omolo v. Gonzales, 452 F.3d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that a court must first determine
whether the petitioner is an alien, since “[o]nly an ‘alien’ may be required to exhaust his
administrative remedies”); Rivera v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1129, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that
the statutory administrative exhaustion requirement does not apply before judicial determination
of a nonfrivolous claim to U.S. citizenship), superseded by statute, REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 10913, 119 Stat. 231 (2005), as recognized in Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2007); Moussa v.
INS, 302 F.3d 823, 825 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the exhaustion provisions of § 1252(d)(1) do
not apply to ‘any person’ challenging a final order of removal, only to an ‘alien,’—precisely what
[petitioner] claims not to be”); see also Ortega-Morales v. Lynch, 168 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1238 (D.
Ariz. 2016) (“Plaintiffs’ failure to appeal to the Administrative Appeals Unit of USCIS does not
run afoul of any statutory exhaustion requirement.”). The Fourth Circuit has stated otherwise but
did not discuss contrary authority from different circuits. Johnson v. Whitehead 647 F.3d 120, 125
(4th Cir. 2011); see also Caroline Holliday, U.S. Citizens Detained and Deported? A Test of the
Great Writ’s Reach in Protecting Due Process Rights in Removal Proceedings, 60 B.C. L. REV. ESUPPLEMENT II.-217, II.-220 to -228 (2019) (summarizing the approach of circuit courts addressing
the exhaustion requirement in the context of removal proceedings).
122. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966); Chau v. INS, 247 F.3d 1026, 1029 n.5 (9th Cir.
2001). Whether this standard should be interpreted the same as “clear and convincing” or whether
the addition of the word “unequivocal” further heightens the burden of proof is a disputed question
that has created an unresolved circuit split. See infra Section III.A.
123. See supra Section II.A.
124. Chau, 247 F.3d at 1029 n.5.
125. See id. (explaining how “evidence of foreign birth gives rise to a rebuttable presumption
of alienage, shifting the burden to the respondent or deportee to prove citizenship”).
126. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(C) (2012).
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immigration judge completed the proceedings.”127 If the individual
subject to a deportation order claims to be a citizen, then the court of
appeals must determine if there is a “genuine issue of material fact” as
to that citizenship.128 If there is no genuine issue, then the court of
appeals “shall decide the nationality claim.”129 If, however, there is a
genuine issue of material fact, then the court must transfer the case to
the district court where the individual resides. The transferee court will
hold “a new hearing on the nationality claim and [make] a decision on
that claim as if an action had been brought in the district court” just as
if the individual had filed a declaratory judgment action seeking
recognition of citizenship status.130 The judicial proceeding considers
the question of citizenship de novo, without deference to the
administrative process.131
Thus, if the case presents a factual question as to citizenship, it
will likely start in the administrative system, jump to the court of
appeals, be sent down to the district court for a factual finding, and only
then potentially go through the ordinary appellate process. These
procedures are supposed to protect against the unlawful deportation of
U.S. citizens. In practice, however, there can be failures at each step.132
Professor Jacqueline Stevens has found, for example, that officers who
conduct arrests may face little scrutiny from above.133 She explains that
“ICE prosecutors are expected to file and attempt to effect all
deportation orders” and that “unlike police, the vast majority of ICE
agents will never testify in an immigration hearing and thus never face
a respondent who might dispute their statements in front of an
adjudicator.”134 Such insulation from accountability can create room for
bad actors who disregard the law.135 The summary nature of the
proceedings and the administrative pressure to process cases also make
error more likely.136
127. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2).
128. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A).
129. Id.
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B).
131. Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1661, 1700
(2000) (“[W]hen a nonfrivolous claim of U.S. citizenship is raised in an administrative deportation
proceeding, due process requires de novo judicial review of the merits.”).
132. See Ilya Somin, Making Federalism Great Again: How the Trump Administration’s Attack
on Sanctuary Cities Unintentionally Strengthened Judicial Protection for State Autonomy, 97 TEX.
L. REV. 1247, 1271 (2019) (“Agency procedures are so defective that ICE has even mistakenly
detained or deported thousands of American citizens.”).
133. Stevens, supra note 117, at 655.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Rosenbloom, supra note 13, at 1969 (“In practice, though, it is fairly easy to
misclassify a U.S. citizen as a noncitizen. Such misclassifications often stem from the relaxed

778

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:3:757

Furthermore, the petitioner is not entitled to appointed counsel
to help navigate these proceedings and may be held in immigration
detention while the proceedings drag out. Given the hardships caused
by long-term detention and the difficulty of prevailing without the
assistance of legal counsel, it is not uncommon for individuals even with
strong claims of citizenship to give up and consent to removal.137 The
lengthy time that some individuals spend in detention can make them
lose motivation to keep fighting; citizens may accept deportation as a
way to escape from confinement.138
Finally, if citizenship does not get resolved prior to removal, it
becomes much more difficult for the individual to challenge the
citizenship decision. Once U.S. citizens are deported, “it is extremely
difficult to receive . . . fair hearings about their claims.”139 The risk of
error is especially high because noncitizens outside the United States
are not typically subject to the protection of the U.S. Constitution.140
This means that “if an immigration judge errantly finds a citizen is an
‘alien’ and he is removed from this country, he is not only stripped of
his fundamental right to citizenship, but he is also stripped of all the
other rights afforded by the Constitution.”141
In sum, the amount of discretion given to Customs and Border
Patrol officers and administrative procedures that emphasize speed
over accuracy create real difficulty for U.S. citizens caught up in
immigration detention and removal proceedings. In spite of legal
standards that require attention to citizenship and prohibit the
detention or removal of citizens, there is still a significant level of
administrative error. More worryingly, the combination of high
discretion and limited oversight leaves room for intentional wrongdoing
as well as mere error, thus allowing the possibility of racial
discrimination or political retaliation in detention and removal
proceedings.

procedural safeguards embodied in the immigration enforcement system, including lack of counsel,
the prospect of prolonged detention, and summary proceedings.”).
137. Stevens, supra note 117, at 612.
138. Id. at 627.
139. Id. at 678.
140. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (“Congress regularly makes rules that
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”). If citizenship has not been adjudicated in a U.S.
proceeding, a person living abroad may seek a certificate of identity that would allow the individual
to travel to the United States to seek an administrative determination of citizenship. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1503(b) (2012); GORDON ET AL., supra note 97, § 104.12(1)(d) (“The need for a certificate of
identity arises when the title to citizenship is not sufficiently clear to warrant issuance of a
passport, but when a prima facie showing has been made in support of the claim.”).
141. Hillary Gaston Walsh, Unequivocally Different: The Third Civil Standard of Proof, 66 U.
KAN. L. REV. 565, 591 (2018).
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C. Expatriation and Denaturalization
Expatriation
(revocation
of
citizenship
status)
and
denaturalization (revocation of citizenship specifically from one who
was previously naturalized) have gone through highs and lows in U.S.
history. Early on, denaturalization was rarely imposed, as the United
States maintained largely open borders and offered a smooth path to
citizenship.142 The political tide turned in 1907, when Congress passed
the first denaturalization statute. Potential bases for denaturalization
included the traditional grounds of fraud and illegal procurement143 as
well as a lack of continued residence in the United States.144 Bases for
expatriation grew to include leaving the country to evade military
service,145 voting in the elections of another country,146 and various
similar acts.147 In the sixty years between 1907 and 1967, more than
twenty-two thousand Americans were involuntarily stripped of
citizenship.148
1. The Rise, Fall, and Rise of Denaturalization
In the first half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
issued a series of opinions limiting the application of denaturalization
and establishing due process protections for such proceedings.149 But it
was not until 1967 that the Supreme Court issued its most influential
opinion on expatriation, ruling that citizenship could be revoked in only
two situations.150 In Afroyim v. Rusk, the Court held that citizenship
could be rescinded only if the individual affirmatively intended to

142. Ngai, supra note 22, at 73 (explaining that “the nation’s borders were soft and, for the
most part, unguarded”).
143. In general, illegal procurement means that the person was not eligible for citizenship.
There can be a subjective element to that determination, however—especially when the ground for
purported ineligibility is a lack of “good moral character” or a failure to be “attached to the
principles of the U.S. Constitution.” Fact Sheet on Denaturalization, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (Oct. 2,
2018), https://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-on-denaturalization/ [https://perma.cc/
3ZLX-E682].
144. The Act presumed that “[n]aturalized U.S. citizens who resided for two years in their
native state or five years in any other foreign state” intended to relinquish their American
citizenship, though the naturalized citizens could rebut that presumption “on the presentation of
satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States.” Jonathan David
Shaub, Expatriation Restored, 55 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 389–90 (2018) (quoting Expatriation Act
of 1907, ch. 2534 § 2, 34 Stat. 1228, 1228).
145. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 147 (1963).
146. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 254 (1967).
147. WEIL, supra note 16, at 178.
148. Robertson & Manta, supra note 32, at 422.
149. Id. at 430–40.
150. See Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 266.
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renounce citizenship or if the individual had improperly gained
citizenship through fraud or illegal procurement.151
After 1967, the number of denaturalization cases shrank to a
fraction of what it had been. Between 1967 and 2013, fewer than 150
people were involuntarily stripped of citizenship (that is, less than one
percent of the previous half century’s number), all for alleged fraud or
illegality.152 The majority of these individuals were former Nazis and
war criminals.153
Denaturalization cases began picking up again under the
Obama Administration. Increased digitalization and “big data” analysis
of computerized information allowed the government to more easily
review immigration files for signs of fraud or ineligibility.154 The
government instituted a program called “Operation Janus” to digitize
and review fingerprint cards, and that program identified just over
eight hundred cases (out of approximately 150,000 files reviewed)
where it appeared that some naturalized citizens had immigration
records under two separate identities.155 Although the Obama
Administration brought more denaturalization cases than other
administrations in the modern era, it could have initiated still more;156
instead, it exercised prosecutorial discretion to focus on cases with a
connection to terrorism or other threats to national security. Even in
such cases, however, the Supreme Court continued its tradition of
pushing back against executive branch efforts to question citizenship.
For example, in 2017, the Supreme Court unanimously held that only
an illegal act that played a role in an individual’s acquisition of U.S.
citizenship could lead to criminal denaturalization.157
The
Trump
Administration
continued
the
Obama
Administration’s review of citizenship records but ended the policy of
prosecutorial discretion.158 As part of the Administration’s overall “zero
tolerance” policy, the government steeply increased the number of cases

151. See id.
152. Robertson & Manta, supra note 32, at 422.
153. WEIL, supra note 16, at 178–79; see also List of Denaturalized Former Citizens of the
United States, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_denaturalized_former_citizens_
of_the_United_States (last visited Apr. 4, 2020) [https://perma.cc/HS63-H2MX] (summarizing and
categorizing individual denaturalization cases).
154. Robertson & Manta, supra note 32, at 409.
155. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., POTENTIALLY INELIGIBLE
INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN GRANTED U.S. CITIZENSHIP BECAUSE OF INCOMPLETE FINGERPRINT
RECORDS 2–3 (2016), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/Mgmt/2016/OIG-16-130Sep16.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6QU-3HKG]; see Robertson & Manta, supra note 32, at 410–11.
156. Robertson & Manta, supra note 32, at 409–10.
157. Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1929 (2017).
158. Amanda Frost, Alienating Citizens, 114 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 48, 62 (2019).
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filed.159 In the first eighteen months of the Trump Administration, the
government filed over one hundred denaturalization cases—nearly as
many as had been resolved in the previous half century.160 And those
cases are only the beginning.161 Most recently, the Department of
Justice has created a new section to focus on prosecuting
denaturalization claims, and “denaturalization case referrals to the
department have increased 600 percent.”162
2. The Due Process of Denaturalization
The combination of these two trends—an increase in the
identification of possible naturalization fraud and a restriction on the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion—raises the risk that innocent
naturalized citizens will find their status in jeopardy. It is therefore
important that the judicial branch protect against overenforcement.
Unfortunately, as we have argued elsewhere, the current litigation
procedures in denaturalization cases fail to protect citizens’ rights.163
Denaturalization can be prosecuted either criminally or civilly.
The process typically begins with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (“USCIS”) referring a potential denaturalization case to the
Department of Justice.164 U.S. Attorneys’ offices then evaluate the case
and file either civil revocation of naturalization actions or criminal
charges in federal district court.165 When citizens are denaturalized,
they return to their last immigration status prior to naturalization—
most commonly, lawful permanent resident status. There is no
guarantee that an individual will keep this status, however, because
the same facts that gave rise to the denaturalization proceeding can
also be used to revoke immigration rights, ultimately rendering the
individual deportable.
On the criminal side, a conviction for naturalization fraud will
automatically result in loss of citizenship as well as up to ten years in
159. Robertson & Manta, supra note 32, at 412.
160. Fact Sheet on Denaturalization, supra note 143.
161. Id. (“Since January 2017, [U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)] has
identified approximately 2,500 cases to be examined for possible denaturalization . . . .”); Press
Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Secures First Denaturalization as a Result of
Operation Janus (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-secures-firstdenaturalization-result-operation-janus [https://perma.cc/J84K-YQWF] (“USCIS . . . has stated its
intention to refer approximately an additional 1,600 [cases] for prosecution.”).
162. Katie Benner, Justice Dept. Establishes Office to Denaturalize Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES,
(Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/26/us/politics/denaturalization-immigrantsjustice-department.html [https://perma.cc/RV7Z-2SHF].
163. Robertson & Manta, supra note 32, at 414.
164. See Fact Sheet on Denaturalization, supra note 143.
165. Id.
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prison.166 Criminal prosecution also carries with it a high level of
required due process—a ten-year statute of limitations, the right to
counsel, and the highest possible burden of proof.167 Given these serious
consequences of a criminal proceeding, civil actions may appear at first
glance to be a less severe option.
In recent years, however, civil denaturalization has been used
as a means of pursuing cases that the government would not have been
able to win in a criminal proceeding.168 In recognition of the difficulties
inherent in criminal actions, an article in the U.S. Attorneys’ Bulletin
recently recommended that prosecutors pursue civil, rather than
criminal, denaturalization cases to take advantage of the “benefits” of a
lower burden of proof, the lack of a jury trial right, and a lack of access
to assigned counsel.169
Civil denaturalization cases are indeed easier for the
government to win—but as we explained in a recent article, ordinary
civil litigation procedures do not do a good job of protecting defendants’
due process interests.170 Each of the following procedural mechanisms
in civil denaturalization makes the cases slightly more difficult to
defend against, and together they risk significant injustices.
First, there is no statute of limitations in civil denaturalization
cases.171 As a result, cases may involve events and evidence that are
decades old, and evidence may rely on hazy memories and longforgotten or long-lost documents. Second, and relatedly, it may be hard
to locate individual defendants and ensure that they are served with
process.172 Unlike in criminal cases, civil cases do not necessarily
require in-person service on the defendant. Third, there is no right to
counsel in a civil action.173 A defendant may not be able to afford an
attorney to defend against citizenship loss and may not be capable of
effectively engaging in self-representation.
Our review of the litigation files for Baljinder Singh—the very
first individual denaturalized through Operation Janus—suggests that
166. Id.; see Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Middlesex County, New Jersey,
Man Admits Attempting to Obtain US Citizenship by Fraud (Apr. 9, 2019),
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/middlesex-county-new-jersey-man-admits-attempting-obtainus-citizenship-fraud [https://perma.cc/XZ78-EQYR] (“The attempted naturalization fraud charge
carries a maximum potential sentence of 10 years in prison.”).
167. Robertson & Manta, supra note 32, at 458–59.
168. Id. at 405.
169. Anthony D. Bianco et al., Civil Denaturalization: Safeguarding the Integrity of U.S.
Citizenship, 65 U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL. 5, 6 (2017) (writing that they “encourage[ ] Federal prosecutors
to consider referring cases for civil denaturalization when a case is declined for prosecution”).
170. Robertson & Manta, supra note 32.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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these issues combined to result in significant procedural infirmities.
Singh’s case illustrates how even when litigation procedures are
properly adhered to, they may be insufficient to guarantee due process
in civil denaturalization cases. Singh first came to the United States in
1991.174 His claim for asylum remained pending for six years, by which
time he was able to get a job, fall in love, and get married to a citizen.175
He was able to qualify first for lawful permanent resident status and
later for citizenship through his marriage.176 In 2017, however,
Operation Janus discovered that Singh had two separate immigration
files tied to his fingerprints—one under the name “Baljinder Singh” and
one under the name “Davinder Singh.”177 “Davinder” failed to show up
for an initial asylum hearing and was ordered deported as a result—
less than a month before “Baljinder” had successfully navigated his
asylum claim for five years, until it was finally dismissed after he
married a U.S. citizen.178 It is unclear why the two files had matching
fingerprints—perhaps this truly arose from fraud, but it is also possible
that the card was placed in the wrong file or that a translator
mistakenly recorded the wrong name.179
Ordinarily, this kind of factual question could be determined
through the course of civil litigation. But the justice system relies on
the presentation of evidence, and that did not happen in the 2017
proceeding. First, process was served on a New Jersey address where
Baljinder Singh once lived. There is some indication, however, that he
no longer lived at that address—citizens, after all, are not required to
keep their address records up to date with the government.180 The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow service to be made by leaving the
summons and complaint with a person of “suitable age and discretion”
who resides at the defendant’s usual place of abode.181 We know that
the summons was left with another individual at Singh’s old address—
but we do not know if Singh still lived there or if the person accepting
service knew him or was able to get the information to him.182
174. Complaint at 2, United States v. Singh, No. 17-7214 (SRC), 2018 WL 305325 (D.N.J. Jan.
5, 2018) [hereinafter Complaint, Singh].
175. See id. at 4–6.
176. Id. at 6.
177. Singh, 2018 WL 305325, at *2.
178. Complaint, Singh, supra note 174, at 2.
179. Robertson & Manta, supra note 32, at 417–18.
180. The authors searched public directory records on Lexis. These records, if correct, suggest
that Singh had moved out of state several years before service was made.
181. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)(B) (allowing service of process on a “person of suitable age and
discretion” who shares a residence with the defendant).
182. See Process Receipt and Return, United States v. Singh, No. 17-7214 (SRC) (D.N.J. Oct.
16, 2017) (on file with author) (showing that service was made upon an individual named Pritam
Singh). The shared last name of “Singh,” however, does not necessarily suggest a familial relation.
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We do know, however, that Singh neither made any appearance
in the denaturalization proceeding nor did any attorney record an
appearance on his behalf. As a result, the proceeding was uncontested.
The court accepted the government’s allegations as true—including the
allegation of intentional fraud—and granted a summary judgment of
denaturalization. There is no indication that the government made any
further attempts to locate Singh, and it is not clear even today that he
knows he has lost his citizenship.
Most civil litigation seeks affirmative relief—monetary
damages, specific performance, or an injunction. In all cases, the
defendant (or at least the defendant’s property) must be found to obtain
relief. A denaturalization case, by contrast, is “only” a status
adjustment. And when that status is adjusted without the defendant’s
participation and a proper adversarial proceeding, it is difficult to have
faith in the result. The Supreme Court, after all, has said that the
cornerstone of due process is notice and an opportunity to be heard.183
It is not clear that Singh had either. Did he know about the
denaturalization case? If he did, could he afford to hire a lawyer—or
navigate the litigation process on his own? We have no way to know,
and thus no way to know whether the government’s allegations against
him were true.
III. THE UNCERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS
The cases described above show that proving citizenship is not
always easy. These difficulties are not isolated examples of injustice;
instead, they are part of a broader legal framework that does not
currently do a good job of safeguarding citizenship rights.
Understanding the structural deficiencies helps to identify procedural
improvements that the judiciary could adopt.
Many of these procedural improvements focus on factfinding.
Professor Jennifer Lee Koh has discussed what she terms the “factual

Baptized Sikh males take the name Singh, most commonly as their last name. Robertson & Manta,
supra note 32, at 416 n.79; see also Common Sikh Names Banned Under Canada’s Immigration
Policy, CBC (July 23, 2007, 5:16 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/common-sikhnames-banned-under-canada-s-immigration-policy-1.689259
[https://perma.cc/3K7E-HAP8]
(discussing the use of Singh as a last name in Sikh tradition). In addition, the city of Carteret,
where Baljinder Singh was last known to live, has the largest Sikh community in the state of New
Jersey. Kevin Coyne, Turbans Make Targets, Some Sikhs Find, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/15/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/15colnj.html
[https://perma.cc/
325D-TWJ2] (stating that in 2008, New Jersey had a population of twenty-five thousand Sikhs
and Carteret was “home to the largest concentration of Sikhs in the state”).
183. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).
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complexity” of citizenship claims, noting that citizenship can be unclear
for a variety of reasons.184 First, “[m]ost citizens do not carry their birth
certificates or passports, and cannot produce them during immigration
enforcement actions that take place within the United States, such as
during workplace raids or criminal arrests.”185 Second, “[s]ome people,
including citizens, do not own either type of document.”186 Third,
“[m]ental illness and poverty may compound the inability to prove, on
the spot, one’s citizenship.”187 And finally, “some individuals may be
citizens without knowing it, due to the rules governing acquired and
derivative citizenship”—rules that have changed just within the last
few years.188
With denaturalization, there is no question about the
individual’s underlying citizenship. There are, however, still complex
factual issues to resolve. Under current law, denaturalization is
available only in cases of fraud or illegal procurement. But because
there is no statute of limitations in civil denaturalization cases, the
relevant underlying facts may go back decades, requiring a court to
examine an individual’s life in a foreign country many years ago, his or
her method of entry into this country, and similar facts. After so long,
it is not uncommon for memories to fade and records—if they ever
existed in the first place—to be lost or destroyed. All of these difficulties
come together to create obstacles to the accurate administrative and
judicial resolution of citizenship questions.
Of course, any judicial evaluation of the costs and benefits of
adjusting litigation procedure requires understanding what the
changes would be measured against. With regard to citizenship
litigation, however, the baseline is murky and uncertain. The confusion
is understandable because much of the Supreme Court precedent
surrounding citizenship was developed in the early part of the
twentieth century.189 Litigation procedure was less developed and less
standardized than it is today.190 As a result, when the Supreme Court
set out various procedural safeguards for citizenship, it often did not
use the same keywords and phrases that later became standardized in
procedural rulings, making it sometimes difficult to see how the
184. Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1824–25 (2013).
185. Id. (footnote omitted).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.; see also Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1687 (2017) (striking down
gender-based differences in derivative citizenship).
189. WEIL, supra note 16, at 111–76 (discussing the development of the precedent through
1967); see Robertson & Manta, supra note 32, at 426–28 (discussing the development through
1952).
190. See infra Sections III.A, III.B.
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citizenship cases should map onto modern procedural frameworks. And
perhaps more importantly, it was not clear whether the Court was
developing common-law protections subject to later change by Congress
or whether it was interpreting the constitutional requirements for
safeguarding citizenship rights in litigation.
A. Ambiguity and Confusion
The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of
citizenship determination and has required heightened due process
protections in many cases dealing with citizenship. But the Court often
failed to make clear whether these protections were constitutionally
required or whether they were merely matters of common law and
therefore potentially subject to change with legislative action.
The Supreme Court’s own later decisions involving
denaturalization or expatriation acknowledged a lack of clarity in the
basis and scope of its earlier procedural rulings. Early denaturalization
cases discussed the need for “clear, unequivocal, and convincing”
evidence to support the retraction of citizenship.191 When the Court
later came back to that language, however, the Justices could not agree
on what it meant in practice. First, just how far did the articulated
standard heighten the ordinary civil burden of proof—was it equivalent
to the later-developed “clear and convincing” standard, or did the
inclusion of the word “unequivocal” bring the standard closer to—or
even beyond—the criminal standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt”?192
Second, was that heightened burden constitutionally required, or was
it merely a default rule to be applied in the absence of controlling
legislation?193
In the mid-century denaturalization case of Klaprott v. United
States, Justice Black wrote in a plurality opinion joined by Justice
Douglas that he believed the government’s burden for removal of
citizenship was “substantially identical with that required in criminal
cases—proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”194 Justices Rutledge and
Murphy agreed that the standard of proof should be interpreted
similarly to that required in criminal cases. They concluded that
denaturalization “required a burden of proof . . . which in effect
191. See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943) (“To set aside such a grant
the evidence must be ‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing’—‘it cannot be done upon a bare
preponderance of evidence which leaves the issue in doubt.’ ” (quoting United States v. Maxwell
Land-Grant Co., 121 U.S. 325, 381 (1887)).
192. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 612 (1949) (plurality opinion).
193. Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413, 420 (9th Cir. 2015).
194. Klapprott, 335 U.S. at 612.
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approximates the burden demanded for conviction in criminal cases,”195
concluding that loss of citizenship possessed a “substantial kinship of
the proceedings with criminal causes,” in the sense that “ordinary civil
procedures, such as apply in suits upon contracts and to enforce other
purely civil liabilities, do not suffice for denaturalization and all its
consequences.”196
Thus, although at least four judges agreed that loss of
citizenship should be supported by a standard of proof equivalent to
that of a criminal proceeding, the Court never adopted that position in
a majority opinion.197 The circuit courts have split on the question, with
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopting the position
that the Supreme Court intended for citizenship cases to be judged by
the intermediate “clear and convincing” standard, and the Sixth Circuit
concluding that the Court’s use of the word “unequivocal” heightened
the intermediate standard to require something more than just “clear
and convincing.”198
The debate over how heightened the standard should be,
however, was soon joined by an even more pressing question: Is a
heightened standard of any sort actually required by the Constitution?
This ambiguity dates back to nearly a century ago, when the court in
Elg had to decide whether a treaty could overcome birthright
citizenship, and it continues today. The Supreme Court in Elg never
specified its basis for allowing an individual to reassert citizenship
rights as an adult after being taken out of the country as a child: Was
it merely reading the relevant treaty as providing such a right, or was
it deciding that the Constitution required such a right?
A later decision from the D.C. Circuit, Nikoi v. Attorney General
of the United States, concluded that the Supreme Court’s basis for the
ruling in Elg must have been constitutional.199 The decision in Nikoi
distinguished the right to reassert citizenship from situations where
individuals seek to restore lawful permanent resident status.200
Although diplomats’ children born in the United States are not entitled
to birthright citizenship, they are entitled to lawful permanent resident

195. Id. at 617–18 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
196. Id.
197. Robertson & Manta, supra note 32, at 435–36.
198. Mondaca-Vega, 808 F.3d at 420; Ward v. Holder, 733 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The
‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing’ standard is a more demanding degree of proof than the ‘clear
and convincing’ standard.”); see also Walsh, supra note 141, at 567 (noting that “the U.S. Supreme
Court declined to resolve this circuit split . . . [and] the remaining ten circuit courts must now
grapple with this issue individually”).
199. 939 F.2d 1065, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
200. Id.
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status as long as they reside in the United States.201 Nevertheless, the
D.C. Circuit held that diplomats’ children born in the United States who
leave as children have no option of reclaiming that status upon
adulthood.202 The decision distinguished Elg, noting that the earlier
ruling “concerns the constitutional entitlement of citizenship, which
carries with it constitutional protections.”203 Lawful permanent
resident status, by contrast, contains no such constitutional dimension.
In 1980, the Court grappled with the potential constitutional
basis for older citizenship rulings in Vance v. Terrazas, a case of
supposed voluntary expatriation.204 This case offered an additional
complexity not present in earlier cases: Congress had adopted
legislation applying a lower burden of proof for voluntary expatriation.
Specifically, the statute provided that “[a]ny person who commits or
performs . . . any act of expatriation . . . shall be presumed to have done
so voluntarily, but such presumption may be rebutted upon a showing,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the act or acts committed or
performed were not done voluntarily.”205 If the Court’s earlierarticulated heightened standard was merely a common-law
development, then it would naturally give way to the legislative
standard. If, on the other hand, heightened review was constitutionally
mandated, then the presumption of voluntary relinquishment must
yield, requiring the government to prove intentional relinquishment by
clear and convincing evidence.206
The Supreme Court’s dicta seemed to suggest that its earlier
requirement for “clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence” in
citizenship cases was only a common-law holding.207 Ultimately,
however, the standard of proof ended up not being dispositive to the
Court’s opinion. The Supreme Court held that there was insufficient
evidence of a voluntary intent to expatriate even under a lower
“preponderance” standard.208 Nonetheless, two Justices issued separate
writings stating they believed the heightened standard was
constitutionally required. Justice Stevens situated the citizenship right
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980) (discussing whether an intent to surrender
U.S. citizenship is required to establish loss of citizenship); Robertson & Manta, supra note 32, at
437−38 (discussing the decision in Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252).
205. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b) (2012).
206. See Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 267 (“[B]y requiring that the expatriating act be proved
voluntary by clear and convincing evidence, the Court of Appeals effectively foreclosed use of the
§ 1481(c) presumption of voluntariness . . . .”).
207. Id. at 258 (quoting Terrazas v. Vance, 577 F.2d 7, 11 (7th Cir. 1978)).
208. Id. at 263.
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within a framework of both substantive and procedural due process,
writing that “[i]n my judgment a person’s interest in retaining his
American citizenship is surely an aspect of ‘liberty’ of which he cannot
be deprived without due process of law,” and concluding that such
liberty must be safeguarded through a heightened burden of proof in
citizenship cases, which in his view would require meeting at least the
intermediate standard of “clear and convincing” evidence.209 Justice
Marshall, writing separately, agreed that a heightened burden of proof
was required under the Constitution.210
In addition to leaving open questions about the appropriate
burden of proof, earlier decisions from the Supreme Court also did not
resolve the appropriate standard of review on appeal. Early
denaturalization cases emphasized a need for a searching review on
appeal that would work in conjunction with the heightened standard of
proof.211 In Baumgartner v. United States, the Court noted that the
benefit of the “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” standard “would be
lost” if questions of fact underlying the citizenship decision could not
also be subject to review on appeal.212 The Court distinguished between
a “subsidiary fact,” for which highly deferential review is desirable, and
a finding of “ultimate ‘facts,’ ” which “more clearly implies the
application of standards of law” and is therefore less entitled to judicial
deference.213 The Court emphasized the need for a searching appellate
review in citizenship cases, which “cannot escape broadly social
judgments—judgment lying close to opinion regarding the whole nature
of our Government and the duties and immunities of citizenship.”214
The Supreme Court’s failure to reconcile these ambiguous
statements about the burden of proof and standard of review on appeal
have created difficulties for courts dealing with citizenship cases. A
recent case from the Ninth Circuit illustrates these difficulties, as the
en banc court fractured over both the required burden of proof and the
appropriate standard for appellate review.215 The case involved a
petitioner in his seventies whose place of birth was disputed. The
petitioner had grown up on the Mexican side of the border but spent his
entire adult life moving back and forth between Texas and Mexico.216
209. Id. at 274 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens would
not give added weight to the Court’s prior use of the word “unequivocal” in the heightened
standard.
210. Id. at 271 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
211. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944).
212. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413, 420 (9th Cir. 2015).
216. Id. at 426–28.
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For decades, he had variously presented two different birth certificates:
one showing he was born in California and the other showing he was
born in Mexico.217 Using his U.S. birth certificate, he had obtained a
Social Security card and a U.S. passport, which had been renewed
without difficulty.218 He used his Mexican birth certificate as early as
1951, however, when he was picked up for various minor crimes; he
believed, apparently correctly, that presenting himself as a non-U.S.
citizen would result in deportation rather than criminal prosecution
and potential continued detention.219 It was not until decades later,
when he was convicted of an assault charge, that the government
connected the two sets of records. As a result, the government sought to
deport the petitioner following his conviction. The district court issued
a finding of fact that the petitioner was not a U.S. citizen, paving the
way for him to be deported.220
On appeal, in the case of Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, the Ninth
Circuit struggled with the question of the petitioner’s citizenship. There
was some evidence on both sides: on the one hand, the petitioner had
persuaded the government of his citizenship well enough to obtain both
a Social Security card and a passport.221 There was no indication that
the U.S. birth certificate used by the petitioner was forged.222 And the
petitioner possessed significant ties to the United States, including
three children who were born within the country and several other
children for whom the government had recognized derivative
citizenship through the petitioner.223 On the other hand, his Mexican
birth certificate also appeared regular.224 Thus, both certificates were
longstanding, having been used for decades without question. It was
clear that the petitioner had a history of claiming whichever country of
citizenship would best suit his interests at the time.
With the evidence so close to equipoise, the standard of proof
could make a real difference in the outcome. A majority of the Ninth
Circuit’s en banc panel held that the appropriate burden of proof was
the intermediate “clear and convincing” standard, asserting that the
Supreme Court had used the phrases “clear and convincing” and “clear,
convincing, and unequivocal” interchangeably, and concluding from

217. Id. at 417–18.
218. Id. at 418–19.
219. See id.
220. Id. at 416–17.
221. Id. at 418.
222. Id. at 417 (“Two authentic birth certificates are in the record . . . [including one] of
Renoldo Mondaca Carlon, born on July 17, 1931 in Imperial, California.” (emphasis added)).
223. Id. at 418.
224. Id. at 417 (noting the authenticity of the Mexican birth certificate).
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this practice that the word “unequivocal” did not add additional
meaning to the intermediate standard.225 The Ninth Circuit therefore
concluded that the district court had properly applied an intermediate
standard of proof.226
Once the Ninth Circuit had accepted the intermediate burden of
proof, it had to decide how the underlying evidence supporting that
burden should be reviewed on appeal. The petitioner argued that the
court should independently evaluate whether the evidence was strong
enough to meet the government’s heightened burden of proof. After all,
earlier denaturalization opinions from the Supreme Court had
emphasized the need for a more searching review than that ordinarily
provided by appellate courts.227 The Ninth Circuit, however, held that
the Supreme Court had abrogated its earlier distinction between
“subsidiary” and “ultimate” facts and thus now required that all review
of judicial factfinding apply a “clear error” standard.228 As long as there
was a “plausible” basis for the district court’s conclusion, the finding of
fact—that is, that the petitioner was born in Mexico rather than the
United States—would stand, and the petitioner could be removed.
Given the balance of the overall evidence, the court concluded that there
was indeed a plausible basis for the district court’s findings.
Thus, these procedural rulings combined to support the removal
and continued exclusion of an individual whose actual citizenship was
far from clear. Even the majority conceded that there were “some
errors” in the district court’s factfinding and that the state of the
evidence was ambiguous. But ultimately the court concluded that when
“there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice
between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”229
Unsurprisingly, the en banc panel’s opinion spawned several
separate writings. Judge Smith, in a concurrence joined by three judges,
stated that he would have held that the Supreme Court’s use of the
word “unequivocal” in citizenship cases should heighten the required
burden of proof beyond the already heightened “clear and convincing”
standard.230 The opinion pointed to conflicting precedent from the Sixth
Circuit, as well as the Supreme Court’s opinion in Addington v. United
States, which stated in a civil-commitment case that “[t]he term
‘unequivocal,’ taken by itself, means proof that admits of no doubt, a

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 420.
Id. at 425–26.
See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
Mondaca-Vega, 808 F.3d at 426.
Id. (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 562, 574 (1985)).
Id. at 430 (Smith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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burden approximating, if not exceeding, that used in criminal cases.”231
As a result, Judge Smith would have remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of this heightened standard.
Judge Murguia also wrote a separate opinion joined in full by
one judge and joined as to the standard of review by four judges.232
Judge Murguia’s opinion contested the majority’s application of the
clear-error standard, noting that the Supreme Court had never
explicitly overruled Baumgartner’s requirement for a more searching
de novo appellate review of the factual basis underlying a citizenship
determination, but had instead reiterated it in both the 1960s and the
1980s.233 Judge Murguia agreed that some questions were
straightforward enough to make clear-error review appropriate, such
as factual questions about how many times the petitioner had been
deported, whether he successfully applied for a Social Security number,
and whether he had ever been convicted of a crime as a U.S. citizen.
But the broader questions of whether the petitioner’s citizenship
evidence had been “procured or obtained by fraud” was not a simple
question of fact—rather, it was “a finding that ‘clearly impl[ies] the
application of standards of law’ ” and should therefore be subject to de
novo appellate review.234 Judge Murguia concluded that the standard
of review would make a difference to the ultimate outcome.235 The
district court, for example, stated that it was unlikely that a U.S. citizen
would allow himself to be deported as deportation would be against his
financial interest.236 Judge Murguia, however, noted that “there is no
evidence in the record to support the district court’s findings regarding
employment opportunities for a farm worker in the 1950s, much less

231. Id. at 430 n.8 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979)) (emphasis omitted).
232. Id. at 436 (Murguia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
233. See id. at 441 (“Until the Supreme Court holds otherwise, Baumgartner and its progeny
remain good law.”); see also Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506 (1981) (“[I]n reviewing
denaturalization cases, we have carefully examined the record ourselves.”); Costello v. United
States, 365 U.S. 265, 269–70 (1961) (“The issue in these cases is so important to the liberty of the
citizen that the weight normally given concurrent findings of two lower courts does not preclude
reconsideration here.”); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 657–58 (1946):
We reexamine the facts to determine whether the United States has carried its burden
of proving by “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence, which does not leave “the
issue in doubt,” that the citizen who is sought to be restored to the status of an alien
obtained his naturalization certificate illegally;
Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 676 (1944) (“But we must be equally watchful that
citizenship once bestowed should not be in jeopardy nor in fear of exercising its American freedom
through a too easy finding that citizenship was disloyally acquired.”).
234. Mondaca-Vega, 808 F.3d at 437 (Murguia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982)) (alteration in the original).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 442.
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Petitioner’s own personal financial motives.”237 Thus, Judge Murguia
believed there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the petitioner
had fraudulently obtained U.S. citizenship.238 If the evidence was in
equipoise such that the Mexican birth certificate and the U.S. birth
certificate could equally likely have been false, then the appellate court
should have concluded that the burden of proof would disallow removal.
B. Prioritizing the Constitutional Basis of Citizenship Procedure
The Mondaca-Vega case raises a fundamental question: Why
should the judiciary go out of its way to protect the citizenship of a
petitioner who cared so little for it that he was willing to claim
whichever country benefitted his interests more at any particular
moment? That question goes to the heart of heightened procedural
protections in citizenship cases. After all, if it is only the individual
interest that matters, then the due process protections of ordinary civil
litigation should surely be good enough. Courts adjudicate matters such
as child custody, workers’ compensation benefits, and other civil
matters that strike at the core of individuals’ lives and concerns every
day. What is different about citizenship?
This Article asserts that citizenship interests are different—
because they stem from the political order enshrined in the U.S.
Constitution.239 The Supreme Court suggested as much in
Baumgartner, writing that “considerations of policy, derived from the
traditions of our people . . . require solid proof that citizenship was
falsely and fraudulently procured” before it can be taken away by the
government.240 The Court warned against applying “the illusory
definiteness of any formula” in citizenship cases, noting that “a too easy
finding that citizenship was disloyally acquired” could lead to a “fear of
exercising . . . American freedom.”241
This chilling effect is necessarily social, political, and structural,
rather than individual. The Court’s concern is not whether a particular
petitioner like the one in Mondaca-Vega is exercising any particular
237. Id.
238. Id. (“Without these clearly erroneous findings, but considering all the other facts as found
by the district court, I would conclude that the Government has not proven by clear, unequivocal,
and convincing evidence that Petitioner is Salvador Mondaca–Vega, citizen of Mexico.”).
239. See Aram A. Gavoor & Daniel Miktus, Snap: How the Moral Elasticity of the
Denaturalization Statute Goes Too Far, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 637, 672 (2015) (suggesting
that Congress codify the “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” standard, and suggesting that if
Congress attempted to codify a less protective standard, such a law “could present confusion in the
lower courts and would likely be held unconstitutional under existing precedent”).
240. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 676 (1944).
241. Id.
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rights of free speech, political association, or religion; its concern is the
potential chilling effect on other people if litigation procedure leaves
citizenship protections vulnerable. The Supreme Court has long
acknowledged the risk of political manipulation of citizenship rights. In
Afroyim v. Rusk, the case that held there could be no involuntary
expatriation for anything short of fraud or illegal procurement of
citizenship, the Court discussed the relationship between democracy
and citizenship at greater length than it had before or has since.242 “The
very nature of our free government,” wrote Justice Black in the majority
opinion, “makes it completely incongruous to have a rule of law under
which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive another
group of citizens of their citizenship.”243
When Justice Black wrote the Afroyim majority opinion in 1967,
he was not speaking hypothetically. The country had already seen the
political risks of limiting citizenship rights, especially in connection
with racial discrimination. The Naturalization Act of 1790 limited
citizenship to “free white person[s],”244 and more than one hundred
years later in 1923, the Supreme Court concluded that naturalized
citizens from India had “illegally procured” their citizenship because
they should not be considered “white” under the law.245 Not only did
Indian-born men lose their U.S. citizenship, but in many cases so did
their American-born wives, who were deemed to take their husbands’
citizenship.246
Starting in the 1930s, the United States engaged in a “massive
campaign” targeting Mexicans for deportation, ultimately deporting
“over one million Mexican immigrants, U.S. citizens of Mexican
ancestry, and undoubtedly other Hispanic U.S. citizens.”247 And of
course, during World War II the United States engaged in the mass

242. 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967); see also Robertson & Manta, supra note 32, at 461 (discussing
the impact of Afroyim).
243. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268.
244. An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790) (repealed
1795); Emmanuel Mauleón, Black Twice: Policing Black Muslim Identities, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1326,
1336 (2018) (“[E]xplicit racial exclusion in naturalization and immigration was not completely
removed until the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.”).
245. See United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 213−15 (1923); Robertson &
Manta, supra note 32, at 425 (discussing the decision).
246. See Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss of
Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405, 433–34 (2005) (noting that the Cable Act of
1922 reaffirmed that American women would lose their citizenship by marrying men who were
ineligible for citizenship).
247. Ediberto Román & Ernesto Sagás, Birthright Citizenship Under Attack: How Dominican
Nationality Laws May Be the Future of U.S. Exclusion, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1383, 1415 (2017).
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internment of U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry.248 The Court was
therefore writing against a backdrop where recent events had shown
that citizenship rights could be fragile, especially in the face of racial
animus. In upholding the rights of citizenship, the Court emphasized
that the language, purpose, and prior construction of the Fourteenth
Amendment show that it protects an individual “against a
congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed,
color, or race.”249
And while racial animus may have motivated earlier
encroachments on citizenship, the Court was quick to note that animusmotivated citizenship restrictions also contained a political component.
The Court concluded that “it seems undeniable from the language [the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment] used that they wanted to put
citizenship beyond the power of any governmental unit to destroy.”250
The Framers were concerned that the citizenship “so recently
conferred” on African Americans was so fragile that a later Congress
might “just as easily take[ ] [it] away from them.”251 By 1967, however,
it was clear that African Americans might not be the only ones so
targeted—political animus, as well as racial animus, could provide
grounds for stripping citizenship rights.252 In turn, if individuals feared
that political participation could result in losing citizenship rights, their
political activity and speech would be chilled.253
Citizenship rights, in the Afroyim Court’s view, go to the heart
of the political polity. In holding that Congress cannot involuntarily
expatriate individuals, the Supreme Court relied on the idea that
“[c]itizenship in this Nation is a part of a cooperative affair.”254
Citizenship is not merely a right granted by the government; under the
United States’ constitutional structure, “[i]ts citizenry is the country
and the country is its citizenry.”255
Later Supreme Court cases failed to return to the strong
language of the Afroyim Court. Afroyim itself was a 5-4 decision viewed
248. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–16 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
249. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
250. Id. at 263.
251. Id. at 262.
252. Thus, for example, many of the mid-century cases dealt with individuals accused of
sympathizing either with Nazis or with Communists. See Robertson & Manta, supra note 32, at
426–27 (describing how “the United States . . . looked inward to fight against a perceived threat of
communist sympathy” during the early 1900s).
253. See Kagan, supra note 104, at 1261 (noting that “[t]he threat of deportation may act as a
deterrent that silences other immigrants”). Such a chilling effect would also occur when
individuals risk losing citizenship status and face potential subsequent deportation.
254. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268.
255. Id.
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as vulnerable to being overturned after a change in Court
membership.256 A switch in position from Justice Harlan saved Afroyim
from being overruled.257 Nonetheless, the Court did not return to the
broad constitutional rhetoric of Afroyim in later cases, preferring
instead to focus on narrower and more technical points, often grounded
in statutory interpretation.258
The Court’s more recent approach in citizenship cases at least
implicitly follows the constitutional avoidance canon. Under this
doctrine, the Supreme Court will not “decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the
case,”259 and “will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other
ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”260 In citizenship cases
of recent decades, the Court has reliably found such alternate
grounds.261 Nevertheless, the constitutional avoidance canon creates
significant difficulties in cases involving citizenship rights. Even when
there may be other grounds to reach the same result—and even when
that result still protects the individual against the loss of citizenship
rights—citizenship questions inherently invoke constitutional norms.
Professor Hiroshi Motomura wrote about the avoidance canon in
immigration law, describing it as “the ‘underenforcement’ of
constitutional norms for prudential reasons.”262 In his view, those
prudential reasons are rooted in a respect for, and deference to, the
political branches of government—especially in cases where Congress
has adopted legislation on point.263 Avoiding the constitutional
256. See Robertson & Manta, supra note 32, at 445 (“[E]ven though the decision got a majority
opinion, it was still seen as vulnerable by those dissatisfied with the ruling. It was, after all, a 5-4
decision reversing a different 5-4 decision less than a decade old.”).
257. Id. at 446.
258. See id. (“[T]hose cases would continue to apply a narrow and formalist approach; none
would return to Afroyim’s broad statements of ‘liberty and equal justice.’” (quoting Afroyim, 387
U.S. at 267)).
259. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(quoting Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905)).
260. Id.
261. See, e.g., Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017) (narrowly interpreting
statutory requirements); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 779 (1988) (“[W]e address only
the issue considered (and resolved in the affirmative) by the Third Circuit: whether § 1101(f)(6)
contains a materiality requirement for false testimony. We hold that it does not.”).
262. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 563 (1990).
263. See id.:
Institutional constraints, especially the judiciary’s sensitivity to its limited factfinding
capability and attenuated electoral responsibility, make courts reluctant to issue a
constitutional command to the political branches of government. Even if such a
command clearly would reflect an established constitutional norm, courts can
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questions through “phantom norm decisionmaking” that finds an
alternate ground to protect the individual short of recognizing a
constitutional right, he points out, may counterintuitively allow the
Court to assure greater protection for immigrants, finding reasons to
rule in their favor without having to strike down legislation.264 And in
some cases, the so-called phantom norms may coalesce into a later
formal recognition of constitutional rights.265
But unless or until that happens, long-term constitutional
avoidance of questions involving fundamental rights can create the
illusion of constitutionality.266 That is, because the actions of the
executive or legislative branch are not explicitly declared
unconstitutional, they may appear to be exercising legitimate power on
the whole, even if particular litigants are able to prevail in individual
cases. If the Court were to expressly grapple with the constitutional
questions underlying those actions, however, it might conclude that
those actions are inconsistent with constitutional protections.
Another problematic effect of such avoidance is that even if the
Supreme Court can find ways to avoid the constitutional questions,
lower courts cannot. And without guidance from the Supreme Court,
they will have to read the tea leaves to guess whether a Supreme Court
result was required by the Constitution. Thus, for example, the D.C.
Circuit had to determine the basis for the Supreme Court’s earlier
decision in Elg to allow children who move away from the United States
to later reassert citizenship as adults.267 If it was merely based on the
intent of the treaty, then perhaps the same approach would apply as
well to children who later want to reassert a right to lawful permanent
resident status.268 On the other hand, if the result was constitutionally
sometimes vindicate that norm less intrusively, and thus perhaps more justifiably,
through the indirect route of statutory interpretation.
(footnote omitted).
264. Id. at 567 (“The centrality of phantom norm decisionmaking in immigration law gradually
emerged through several Supreme Court decisions from roughly the same period as Mezei, Knauff,
and Harisiades. Their unifying characteristic is their propensity to use phantom norm
constitutional reasoning to reach subconstitutional outcomes favorable to aliens.”).
265. See id. at 612 (“One defense of phantom norm decisions is that they have been a useful
testing ground for new constitutional ideas without the need to challenge prevailing doctrine . . .
this process may be a healthy, perhaps preferred, and perhaps even inevitable form of
constitutional change.”).
266. See id. (explaining that the use of “phantom norm decisionmaking” in immigration law
created a gulf between those who adhered to the plenary power doctrine and those who believe
that the Constitution allows for a greater role in judicial oversight).
267. See Nikoi v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 939 F.2d 1065, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (concluding that
Elg only concerns the “constitutional entitlement of citizenship” and does not suggest that a right
to permanent residence carries the same constitutional status).
268. See id. (discussing and rejecting the argument that “as in the case of citizenship, an intent
to abandon permanent resident status may not be attributed to a minor”).
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required in Elg only as a matter of citizenship rights, then the case
could be limited to apply only to citizenship and not to immigration
status.269
In evaluating the constitutional basis of the Elg case, the D.C.
Circuit suggested that broader political and social rights were at issue
in citizenship cases. It acknowledged that citizenship carries with it
certain constitutional protections that residence in the United States
does not.270 As a result, the D.C. Circuit was able to conclude that the
Court’s earlier decision was best understood as a constitutional
ruling.271
Recognizing the constitutional basis of citizenship rights is the
first step to ensuring protection of those rights, and the Supreme Court
should not shy away from it. The language used to talk about such
rights can be powerful: “In modern constitutional discourse, calling
citizenship a ‘right’ gives it weight; it shifts the burden to the
government to come forward with compelling reasons for its actions
that abridge or deny citizenship.”272 Of course, not every litigant will be
focused on questions of citizenship. To the individual, lawful permission
to live and work in the United States may be of more immediately
practical import than more ethereal rights of citizenship.
Nonetheless, the principles of democracy underlying the U.S.
Constitution are tied to the political and social rights inherent in
citizenship and the political community. John Hart Ely reasoned that
the Constitution’s role is to protect the rights of those who are left out
or left behind in the political process.273 He argued that judicial review
should examine “questions of participation,” rather than “the
substantive merits of . . . political choice.”274 The history of citizenship,
immigration, and political participation in the United States makes it
clear that the courts are needed to protect democratic rights.275
If heightened procedural safeguards are not constitutionally
required, then the political branches may limit the right to challenge

269. See id. (explaining that the Court remained “unpersuaded” by arguments likening
permanent resident status to citizenship).
270. Id.
271. See id.
272. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471, 1484
(1986).
273. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
274. Id. at 181.
275. See Ming H. Chen & Zachary New, Silence and the Second Wall, 28 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 549, 586 (2019) (“The legal effects of the second wall prompt Constitutional and statutory
violations, procedural deprivations, and tangible suffering in the form of denied benefits, intense
anxiety, and feelings of exclusion.”).
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citizenship determinations—either in all cases or, more perniciously, in
the case of disfavored citizens. The Afroyim Court was correct to
recognize that it is inconsistent with our system of constitutional
democracy to allow the deprivation of citizenship for political reasons.276
Returning to a constitutional analysis of due process in citizenship
litigation is the best way to ensure that this cannot happen.
IV. HEIGHTENING THE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS OF CITIZENSHIP
Of course, focusing on the constitutional protections of
citizenship is only a beginning. Courts must also decide what those
protections are and how far they extend. Although the parameters of
constitutional citizenship protection are currently vague and unformed,
the process by which those parameters should be established is much
clearer under the Court’s directives for procedural due process.277
Courts evaluating constitutional due process must conduct what
is in essence a cost-benefit analysis.278 The Supreme Court has held that
the judge must weigh the risk that the plaintiff will be erroneously
deprived of liberty against the cost of providing additional procedures
to safeguard against such error.279
The Supreme Court set out the factors to consider in Mathews v.
Eldridge, a case dealing with an individual’s right to Social Security
benefits.280 In that case, the Supreme Court held that the reviewing
court must first consider the plaintiff’s “private interest that will be
affected by the official action.”281 Second, the court must examine “the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards.”282 Finally, the court must weigh “the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.”283 Taken together, the court
must evaluate which interest weighs more: the individual’s interest in

276. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267–68 (1967) (“Citizenship is no light trifle to be
jeopardized any moment Congress decides to do so . . . .”).
277. See Irina D. Manta & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Secret Jurisdiction, 65 EMORY L.J.
1313, 1331 (2016) (explaining the Supreme Court’s approach to procedural due process).
278. Id.
279. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (describing the various factors courts
consider when identifying “the specific dictates of due process”).
280. See id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
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receiving the requested process, or the government’s burden and cost in
administering that process.
Because the Mathews Court focused on an individual’s right to
monetary benefits, it did not need to consider whether the public might
have an interest on both sides of the case. But in cases that raise issues
of public benefit, the public’s interest must weigh in the equation as
well. This means that the public’s interest will be represented on both
sides of the balancing test—with the public benefit joining the
individual benefit on one side, weighed against the administrative cost
and burden on the other side.284
When it comes to citizenship, the balancing test should also
consider more than the financial and administrative cost—it should
consider the broader harm to the public interest when citizenship is
underprotected. Litigation, after all, never results in perfect
accuracy.285 The Supreme Court has preferred overprotection to
underprotection, writing, “It is better that many . . . immigrants should
be improperly admitted than that one natural born citizen of the United
States should be permanently excluded from his country.”286
A. The Burden and Standard of Proof
The Supreme Court’s choice of phrasing—that it is better to
improperly admit many immigrants than to permanently exclude a
single citizen—is a common refrain, heard most often in the criminal
context.287 William Blackstone himself wrote in the nineteenth century
that it was “better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one
innocent suffer.”288 Justice Harlan echoed the sentiment, writing that
“it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go
free.”289 What all of these formulations have in common is a recognition
of the substantive value of liberty and a willingness to draw a line that
allows for the underenforcement of regulatory law to ensure that such
liberty is not wrongfully curtailed. In the criminal context, liberty is
284. See Robert W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 503, 506 (1998) (“As far as the second [Mathews] factor is concerned, society’s paramount
interest must be in a just determination of a person’s fundamental rights and privileges.”).
285. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he trier of fact
will sometimes, despite his best efforts, be wrong in his factual conclusions.”).
286. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 464 (1920).
287. See Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 198–206 (1997) (collecting
cases and exploring the different courts’ formulations for how to weigh the wrongful acquittal of
the guilty against the wrongful conviction of the innocent).
288. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 352 (1770).
289. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also id. at 361 (majority
opinion) (“The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation.”).
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viewed as freedom from imprisonment. In the immigration context,
liberty means protecting the civil and political rights of citizens—even
at the risk of underenforcing substantive immigration law.
This parallel between criminal law and citizenship litigation
extends into assigning the burden and setting the standard of proof.
Making the government bear the burden of proof and assigning a
heightened standard are ways to ensure that an individual is not
wrongfully deprived of liberty.290 In the criminal context, of course, the
government bears the burden of proof and must prove guilt by the
highest standard possible—beyond a reasonable doubt.291 Although the
origin of the rule is murky, by 1970 the Supreme Court agreed that it
had “long been assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a
reasonable doubt is constitutionally required,” and explicitly held that
due process mandated this heightened burden.292 In so ruling, the Court
focused on the interest of the accused, referring to the liberty interest
as one of “transcending value.”293 It also pointed to the value to society,
stating that “the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to
command the respect and confidence of the community in applications
of the criminal law.”294 In conducting the due process analysis, the
Court did not expressly discuss the costs of such a holding—that is, that
criminal proceedings are expensive, and that requiring such a high
burden of proof necessarily means that some guilty individuals will go
free, potentially causing additional societal harm. The implicit
conclusion of the Court’s holding, however, was that the combination of
individual liberty and societal trust in the criminal justice system
outweighed the risk that some guilty people would go free.
Even though the Supreme Court has not clarified that a
heightened burden of proof is constitutionally required in citizenship
cases, similar reasoning should apply. Under a due process analysis,
both the individual liberty interest and the societal interest in
citizenship are extremely high. From a liberty point of view, citizenship
ensures that the individual has the right to live, work, and raise a
family in the United States. Citizenship also gives individuals a voice
in the political life of the country, ensuring that their values and
concerns can help to shape the future of the nation. This ability blends
into the societal interest in citizenship. A constitutional system that
290. See Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 75 CALIF.
L. REV. 1665, 1718 (1987) (“Requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt guards against condemning
people for crimes they did not commit.”).
291. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
292. Id. at 362.
293. Id. at 364.
294. Id.
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lodges sovereignty in its citizens possesses serious reason to ensure that
citizenship rights do not rest on a precarious base.
Furthermore, the costs of a heightened burden of proof are lower
in citizenship cases than they are in criminal cases. Allowing a guilty
person to go free creates risks both to immediate public safety and to
the perceived reliability of the criminal justice system. Improperly
admitting an immigrant or erring in concluding that a baby was born
on the U.S. side of the border rather than the Mexican side creates no
public safety risk.
Lower courts struggle with the constitutional parameters of
several procedural due process issues in citizenship cases, including the
questions of whether the Supreme Court’s earlier use of the word
“unequivocal” raised the standard of proof above “clear and
convincing,”295 whether Congress possesses the right to adopt a
diminished burden of proof, and when the burden of proof should switch
from the government to the individual.296 But if the Supreme Court
were to directly analyze the constitutional basis of the burden and
standard of proof in citizenship cases, it would very likely follow the
same reasoning it applied in In re Winship, which held that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt was constitutionally required in criminal
cases.297 If so, the Court could clarify that procedural due process
necessitates a heightened burden of proof in citizenship cases—perhaps
even, as some Supreme Court Justices wrote earlier, a burden that
“approximates the burden demanded for conviction in criminal
cases.”298
B. Jury Trials or Equitable Defenses?
The Supreme Court has inconsistently analyzed the underlying
nature of the citizenship claim. It has held that jury trials are not
available in denaturalization proceedings because such actions are
essentially equitable in nature, rather than legal—and the Seventh
Amendment does not apply to actions in equity. In 1913, a defendant
appealed his denaturalization by arguing that the trial court erred in
refusing to grant him a jury trial on the facts underlying the

295. See supra Section III.A (discussing the ambiguity plaguing the Court’s discussions of the
standard of review for citizenship cases).
296. See supra Section III.A (noting the complexities generated by the Court’s citizenship
jurisprudence).
297. See 397 U.S. at 394 (holding that due process mandates the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard).
298. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 617–18 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
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government’s suit against him.299 The Supreme Court held that he was
not entitled to a jury trial on his claim to set aside a denaturalization
decree, as “[t]he right asserted and the remedy sought were essentially
equitable, not legal,” and “[i]n this respect it does not differ from a suit
to cancel a patent for public land or letters patent for an invention.”300
The same rule would presumably apply to declaratory judgments
seeking recognition of citizenship.301
But the Court’s analogy of the citizenship case to land or patent
rights conflicts with later precedent giving heightened protection to
citizenship rights and distinguishing citizenship claims from other
types of civil litigation.302 And the country’s Founders certainly viewed
jury trials as essential to protecting fundamental rights: after all, one
of the grievances listed in the Declaration of Independence included the
king’s “depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury.”303
Given the Founders’ emphasis on the jury as one of the fundamental
protections of democracy, it would not be unreasonable for the Supreme
Court to conclude that the Seventh Amendment’s jury-trial right should
extend to cases involving citizenship.304 Nevertheless, later defendants’
attempts to overturn the Court’s decision denying the right to a jury
trial have not yet succeeded, and lower courts have continued to deny
jury trials in citizenship cases.305
Even though the Supreme Court relied on the equitable nature
of citizenship cases to deny jury-trial rights, it also held that individuals
facing denaturalization cannot raise equitable defenses to the
underlying charge (and so, for example, cannot invoke the equitable

299. See Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 27 (1913).
300. Id. at 27–28.
301. See FED. R. CIV. P. 57 (introducing the “rules [that] govern the procedure for obtaining a
declaratory judgment”); Note, Right to Jury Trial in Declaratory Judgment Actions: A Narrowing
Interpretation, 59 YALE L.J. 168, 168 (1949) (“Courts have long insisted that parties be given the
same constitutional right to jury trial in declaratory actions as they have in non-declaratory
proceedings.”).
302. See Klapprott, 335 U.S. at 617 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (explaining that “ordinary
civil procedures, such as apply in suits upon contracts and to enforce other purely civil liabilities,
do not suffice for denaturalization and all its consequences”).
303. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776).
304. See Suja A. Thomas, Judicial Modesty and the Jury, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 780 (2005)
(“The Founders recognized the importance of the division of power between the judiciary and the
jury. Generally discussing the jury, Thomas Jefferson expressed a strong belief in the power of the
people in the form of the jury as a check on the judiciary.”); see also Douglas A. Berman, Making
the Framers’ Case, and a Modern Case, for Jury Involvement in Habeas Adjudication, 71 OHIO ST.
L.J. 887, 891 (2010) (“[S]cholars have long noted that the Framers viewed juries as a key
component of democratic government in a new nation.”).
305. See, e.g., United States v. Schellong, 717 F.2d 329, 336 (7th Cir. 1983) (“We remain bound
by the Supreme Court’s holding in Luria v. United States that there is no right to a jury trial in a
denaturalization proceeding.” (citation omitted)).
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defense of laches when the government waits for years or decades to
challenge citizenship).306 The Court stated that it was inappropriate for
courts to “moderate or otherwise avoid the statutory mandate of
Congress in denaturalization proceedings.”307 Likewise, lower courts
have held that the government will not be equitably estopped from
challenging an individual’s citizenship even after having previously
granted the individual documents identifying the individual as a
citizen.308
The Court did not specify whether its approach would apply to
citizenship litigation more broadly or just to denaturalization
proceedings, but both categories are similar in many respects. Both deal
with the status of the individual: citizenship litigation more broadly
asks whether the person is a citizen (by birth, by derivative attainment,
or by naturalization), and denaturalization proceedings examine
whether an individual fraudulently or illegally obtained citizenship
status. The proceedings in both types of cases are intended to settle the
status of the individual, not to punish.309 Furthermore, Congress is
constitutionally empowered to set citizenship requirements in
naturalization proceedings and has likewise legislated requirements for
derivative citizenship.
The Court’s stated deference to Congress cannot logically
support a complete avoidance of equitable remedies, however. Even
though Congress is active in this arena, courts may still engage in
judicial review of the constitutionality of its legislation. Just three years
ago in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, the Supreme Court struck down a
provision that made it easier for unwed citizen mothers to pass down
citizenship to their children born abroad than it was for unwed citizen
fathers.310 The Court held that such a provision violated the Equal
Protection Clause.311 Thus, deference to Congress is not absolute but
306. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 517 (1981) (“We agree with the Court of
Appeals that district courts lack equitable discretion to refrain from entering a judgment of
denaturalization against a naturalized citizen whose citizenship was procured illegally or by
willful misrepresentation of material facts.”).
307. Id.
308. See, e.g., Lapides v. Watkins, 165 F.2d 1017, 1019 (2d Cir. 1948) (“The issuance of the
certificate or any statements made by the consul in connection therewith could not create an
estoppel against the Government.”); Uyeno v. Acheson, 96 F. Supp. 510 (W.D. Wash. 1951) (“The
issuance of [a Certificate of Identity] does not work an estoppel against the Government.”).
309. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101–02 (1958) (plurality opinion) (concluding that using
denationalization as punishment would violate the Eighth Amendment).
310. See 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1687 (2017) (explaining that under the statute “only one year of
continuous physical presence is required before unwed mothers may pass citizenship to their
children born abroad,” whereas an unwed father was required to maintain five years of physical
presence).
311. See id. at 1701.
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must be subject to constitutional requirements. And equitable defenses,
which date back to the development of cases in equity, are well
established as part of the due process enshrined in equitable
proceedings—they are part of the right to be heard.312
The Court is likely correct that citizenship litigation tends
toward the equitable rather than the legal, and that distinction may be
sufficient to deny the right to a jury trial.313 Monetary damages are not
generally at issue, and in fact would be wholly insufficient to protect
against the mistaken loss of citizenship rights. Although there may be
some amount of money that an individual would accept in lieu of voting
rights or as compensation for a lost passport, the greater part of the
injury is not to the individual—it is to the democratic system, which is
built on citizen participation. Even when a citizen makes the choice not
to participate in an election, the ultimate result still possesses
legitimacy because the outcome is the sum of the choices exercised by
the citizens, including their choice about whether to participate or not.
When citizens are denied the opportunity to exercise those rights,
however, the end result loses legitimacy.
But if citizenship litigation is equitable at heart, then
individuals should be able to raise equitable defenses to citizenship
challenges. Equitable defenses were developed, after all, to ensure due
process in a system that relied heavily on judicial discretion. Equitable
defenses therefore substitute in some ways for the protections that
would otherwise be given through the right to a jury trial. Without
being able to rely on society’s participation through a jury trial,
individuals must be able to use equitable defenses to protect societal
interests.
Raising a defense of estoppel, for example, protects society’s
interest in the finality of citizenship determinations in situations where
the government has long recognized an individual’s citizenship status.
Once that person has engaged with the community and with the polity
over time as a citizen, government action to strip that status creates a
sense of insecurity that could dampen willingness to participate in the
political life of the country. The equitable defense of laches plays a
similar role in protecting the finality interest, and it also counters the
risk acknowledged in Afroyim that political expediency may cause the

312. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972) (stating that the opportunity to be heard
includes “an opportunity to present every available defense”); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (holding that the “opportunity to be heard” is a fundamental
requirement of due process).
313. But see Berman, supra note 304, at 888 (arguing for an expanded understanding of jurytrial rights).
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government to scapegoat certain citizens.314 Without such a remedy,
there is a risk that a new administration might come into power and
target individuals or members of minority groups for extra scrutiny,
even years or decades after an earlier administration had approved
their citizenship. A defense of laches incentivizes the government to
raise legitimate issues quickly and guards against the politicization of
citizenship scrutiny.
C. The Importance of Counsel
Appointing counsel for individuals subject to deportation or
denaturalization orders would also go a long way toward protecting
against unjust denial of citizenship rights. Is loss of citizenship—
whether explicit or de facto—meaningfully different than the risk of
incarceration noted in Gideon v. Wainwright?315 The Gideon Court,
after all, based its decision in procedural due process and concluded
that the rights protected by the provision of counsel outweighed the
financial costs.316 The Supreme Court noted the revealed preference for
legal counsel, concluding, “That government hires lawyers to prosecute
and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the
strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal
courts are necessities, not luxuries.”317 Again, if the judiciary truly
explores the constitutional dimensions of citizenship, it may well find
that the liberty interests inherent in citizenship are of equal weight to
the liberty interests at issue when incarceration is threatened.
Courts and scholars have explored the possible extension of
Gideon to other civil contexts. One scholar suggested that there may be
a due process right to counsel for unaccompanied migrant children.318
Judges have also acknowledged the importance of counsel for accurate
decisionmaking: “As every trial judge knows, the task of determining
the correct legal outcome is rendered almost impossible without
effective counsel. Courts have neither the time nor the capacity to be

314. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (“The very nature of our free government makes
it completely incongruous to have a rule of law under which a group of citizens temporarily in office
can deprive another group of citizens of their citizenship.”).
315. See 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (stating that it is an “obvious truth” that “any person haled
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided
for him”).
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. See Linda Kelly Hill, The Right to Be Heard: Voicing the Due Process Right to Counsel for
Unaccompanied Alien Children, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 41, 60–65 (2011).
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both litigants and impartial judges on any issue of genuine
complexity.”319
The Supreme Court has so far declined to extend a right to
counsel outside of cases where incarceration is threatened—that is,
where there is a “potential loss of physical liberty.”320 States, however,
have experimented with civil Gideon rights in cases implicating
fundamental rights, particularly those involving the parent-child
relationship and the threatened termination of parental rights.321
Family law cases may be well suited for a state version of civil Gideon,
as the state courts are paramount in such scenarios. But questions of
U.S. citizenship are inherently federal. It is true that civil Gideon is not
likely to be a panacea in citizenship litigation.322 Certainly, it is no
panacea in the criminal sphere—high caseloads and limited funding
impair access to criminal justice even when attorneys are provided.323
But other methods of rights enforcement are similarly flawed. It
is difficult, for example, for a wrongfully removed citizen to later recover
civil damages. Federal courts have held that such an action may lie
when there was no probable cause for arresting and detaining a U.S.
citizen.324 In some cases, the evidence may be strong enough to support
a subsequent civil case. In Lyttle v. United States, for example, the court
left pending several civil causes of action, including Bivens claims325
against various federal officials as well as “the Federal Tort Claims Act
claims against the United States for false imprisonment, negligence,

319. Sweet, supra note 284, at 505.
320. Suzanne A. Kim, Transitional Equality, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 1149, 1195 (2019); see also
Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 435 (2011) (declining to extend a right to counsel in child-support
contempt cases); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981) (declining to extend a right
to counsel in parental termination cases).
321. See Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to Counsel in Civil
Cases, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 245, 245–46 (2006),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_39169.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A8QG-93HL] (discussing state right-to-counsel statutes and court rules
governing family law issues).
322. See Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L.
REV. 1227, 1227–29, 1231–34 (2010) (advancing numerous criticisms of civil Gideon, including the
prediction that appointed counsel in civil cases would be of limited utility given the prior poor
funding efforts for civil justice).
323. See id. at 1251–55 (discussing underfunding and crippling caseloads, which inevitably
harm the quality of indigent defense).
324. See Gray v. Weselmann, 274 F. Supp. 3d 81, 86 (D. Conn. 2017) (“In order for plaintiff to
prevail on either of the first two claims—false arrest/imprisonment and malicious prosecution—
he must prove a lack of probable cause to detain and prosecute him for unlawful reentry.”), aff’d,
737 F. App’x 30 (2d Cir. 2018).
325. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389
(1971) (establishing an implied right of action under the Constitution to sue for damages following
an unlawful search and seizure).
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and intentional infliction of emotional distress.”326 But when the
evidence of citizenship is mixed, as it is in most cases, recovery is far
less certain. One federal court, for example, held that the evidence of
citizenship “[a]t best . . . gave reason to further investigate plaintiff’s
residence at the time that his father naturalized in 1990.”327 One
possibility is to put a higher affirmative duty on law enforcement
officials to determine citizenship before deportation, which would, in
turn, make it more likely that wrongfully deported individuals could
successfully maintain an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Reconsidering what level of inquiry is reasonable under the
circumstances can inform the probable cause determination—if greater
inquiry is required, then probable cause to detain an individual may
evaporate when evidence of citizenship can be easily obtained.328 But
this would require a multi-step process: first heightening what we
expect from law enforcement officers and then hoping that the financial
costs of civil litigation could better regulate government conduct, an
uncertain prospect at best.329
Appointing counsel, while still an imperfect protection, is
nevertheless the most direct way to avoid some of the greatest
miscarriages of justice.330 Judge Pregerson on the Ninth Circuit
recently wrote that he would find a due process right to counsel in
expedited removal proceedings, pointing out that “[t]he risk of
erroneous removal is . . . substantial for individuals who are
incompetent due to mental illness or disability.”331 This risk extends
both to citizens and noncitizens; certainly, mental illness played a large
role in the deportation of citizen Mark Lyttle described above,332 and
there are other documented cases of citizens with mental illness being

326. Lyttle v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1302 (M.D. Ga. 2012).
327. Gray, 274 F. Supp. 3d at 87.
328. See Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 1029
(2003) (“Recasting probable cause within a reasonableness framework can open the way for more
creative thinking about accommodating law enforcement priorities on the one hand and preserving
civil liberties on the other.”).
329. See Edward T. Schroeder, Note, A Tort by Any Other Name? In Search of the Distinction
Between Regulation Through Litigation and Conventional Tort Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 897, 897
(2005) (“The debate over regulation through litigation is part of a larger dispute over the proper
role of tort law and the civil justice system in American society.”).
330. See Renata Robertson, Note, The Right to Court-Appointed Counsel in Removal
Proceedings: An End to Wrongful Detention and Deportation of U.S. Citizens, 15 SCHOLAR 567, 571
(2013) (arguing in favor of a civil Gideon in deportation cases).
331. United States v. Peralta-Sanchez, 847 F.3d 1124, 1145 (9th Cir. 2017) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting), opinion withdrawn on grant of reh’g, 868 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2017), and on reh’g, 705
F. App’x 542 (9th Cir. 2017).
332. See supra Section II.B.1 (describing Lyttle’s detention and removal after being charged
with a misdemeanor during his treatment at a psychiatric facility).
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removed from the country in immigration proceedings.333 Most
American citizens cannot afford counsel, and the most vulnerable
citizens are the least likely to be able to do so.334 The Supreme Court
previously stated that it was willing to accept a high cost to ensure that
not “one natural born citizen of the United States should be
permanently excluded from his country.”335 Without a right to
appointed counsel in cases where citizenship is claimed, it will almost
certainly be impossible to meet the Court’s goal of protecting citizens
against the threat of wrongful removal.
CONCLUSION
In American life, much depends on citizenship status.
Citizenship gives rise to the right to vote, to obtain a passport, to accept
employment, and even to enter and remain in the United States. Given
the centrality of citizenship, it is somewhat surprising that little
attention has been paid to the question of how contested questions of
citizenship are resolved. Disputed questions of citizenship arise
frequently in civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings. The
procedures by which these matters are resolved carry great weight,
affecting Americans’ ability to exercise fundamental rights as well as
the resiliency of the democratic principles on which the United States
was founded.
But citizenship litigation has not been able to sufficiently protect
individual rights. Scholars have noted that citizenship has been used
as a weapon to deny rights to those who are politically disfavored,
whether for their own actions or for their unpopular position in society.
In a number of cases, citizens have even been deported from their own
country and left to fend for themselves in a foreign country with which
they have no connection. In other cases, the government has pursued
denaturalization based on decades-old records.
333. See Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV.
181, 213–14 (2017) (“In 2001, Deolinda Smith-Willmore, who suffered from partial blindness and
schizophrenia, was subjected to an administrative removal order and deported to the Dominican
Republic despite being a U.S. citizen.”).
334. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice Through the
(Un)corporate Practice of Law, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 43, 45 (2014) (“Conventional legal services
are simply beyond the means of most Americans.”); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Private Ordering
in the Market for Professional Services, 94 B.U. L. REV. 179, 195 (2014) (noting the “large
population of individuals who need, but cannot afford, legal services”); Soulmaz Taghavi, MontesLopez v. Holder: Applying Eldridge to Ensure a Per Se Right to Counsel for Indigent Immigrants
in Removal Proceedings, 39 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 245, 252 (2014) (“[I]mmigrants, an extremely
vulnerable population, often ‘either cannot afford counsel or are shuffled through the system before
they have a chance to find a lawyer.’ ” (footnote omitted)).
335. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 464 (1920).
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Protecting citizenship in these cases means rethinking litigation
procedures. Litigation over citizenship status is different from most
civil litigation. The former often requires factual determinations about
events that happened many decades ago—meaning that the question of
who bears the burden of proof becomes much more important.
Individuals may have a strong reliance interest, especially in cases
where the government recognized them as citizens for years or decades
before challenging the validity of their citizenship. The liberty interests
that arise in a citizenship proceeding may be just as important to the
individual as those that arise in a criminal case. Issues of citizenship,
moreover, affect the national interest in a way that ordinary civil cases
or criminal prosecutions do not. It is only by protecting citizenship
interests that constitutional democracy, which rests on the idea of
political equality, can function. It is therefore incumbent on the judicial
system to ensure that litigation procedures in citizenship cases offer
protection commensurate with the interests at stake in those suits.

